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The Limits of Lay Participation Reform in 
Japanese Criminal Justice 
 
DAVID T. JOHNSON1 AND DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE2  
 
“The past is never dead.  It’s not even past.” 





This article assesses recent reforms in Japanese criminal justice.  It 
focuses on the effects of three new forms of lay participation that are 
described in the other articles in this symposium: the lay judge trial system, 
victim participation, and mandatory prosecution through citizen review of 
non-charge decisions.  We argue that while many things have been modified 
in Japan’s criminal process, there is more continuity than change with respect 
to criminal justice substance (who exercises control) and outcome (who gets 
what).  In this respect, the past is not really past in Japanese criminal justice. 
Given that the main aim of the lay judge reform—Japan’s most ambitious 
reform—was to “enhance the power and authority of the judiciary” by 
increasing public trust in it,3 the reproduction of substance and outcome in 
Japanese criminal justice is unsurprising.4  In that it has enhanced the authority 
of the judiciary and the procuracy, it could even be called a conservative 
success.  
 
 1. Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
 2. Dimitri Vanoverbeke is a Professor of Japanese Studies and director of the Department of 
Area Studies at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven), a research university in Flanders, 
Belgium.  He is also the author of Juries in the Japanese Legal System: The Continuing Struggle 
for Citizen Participation and Democracy (Routledge, 2015). 
 3. N. Yanase, Deliberative Democracy and the Japanese Saiban-in (Lay Judge) Trial System, 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, 3 (2) (2016), 327, 333-334. 
 4. As Article 1 of the Lay Judge Law states, “… Through the participation in criminal 
proceedings of lay assessors, who have been selected from among the people, with judges, this 
legislation seeks to contribute to the promotion of the public’s understanding of the judicial system 
and thereby raise their confidence in it.”  For an annotated translation of this law, see K. Anderson 
& E. Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning 
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW AND POLICY JOURNAL, 6 
(2005), 233. 
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We acknowledge that Japan’s lay judge reform has had some “pro-
defendant” effects.5  For example, there has been a slight rise in the acquittal 
rate for defendants charged with serious crimes.  There have been declines 
in use of the two most severe criminal sanctions: life sentences and death 
sentences.  There has been a rise in the percentage of suspended sentences 
with probation. There has been a drop in the percentage of cases booked by 
police that end up being charged by prosecutors.  There has been an increase 
in the willingness of judges to deny prosecutors’ requests for the detention 
of suspects and defendants.  And there has been a rise in the percentage of 
detainees released on bail before a trial verdict is issued.6 
In addition to these small-to-modest changes in substance, the lay judge 
reform has induced a “wide range” of “transformational” effects in Japanese 
criminal procedure. 7   One prominent analyst has concluded that “many 
issues remain, but when one thinks back on the situation at the time the new 
system was introduced, the level of success is quite remarkable.”8  On this 
view, the lay judge system has created more respect for the presumption of 
innocence, 9  a perception that is shared by some other observers. 10   It  
has made prosecutors more cautious about charging borderline cases, and 
hence may be preventing some wrongful convictions.11  It has led to more 
 
 5. RIEKO KAGE, WHO JUDGES? DESIGNING JURY SYSTEMS IN JAPAN, EAST ASIA, AND 
EUROPE (Cambridge University Press 2017), p. 6. 
 6. Kage, 2017, pp. 175, 202. 
 7. M. Inouye, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials and Reformation of Criminal Justice 
in Japan, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, RESOURCE MATERIAL NR. 105 (2018) 74-
115.  
 8. D. H. Foote, Citizen Participation: Appraising the saiban’in system, MICHIGAN STATE 
INT’L L. REV., 22.3 (2014) 755, 763. 
 9. Foote, supra note 8, 764. 
 10. M. Takeda, ‘Zaimei ochi’ hinpatsu, kisoritsu teika [‘Charge Rate Reduced’ Frequent, 
Declining Indictment Rate], KŌCHI SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: One 
Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 1), (Jan. 30, 2019) 12.  The other articles in Takeda’s series 
of five are as follows: M. Takeda, Utagawashiki wa muzai, tettei, Yūzairitsu teika: risshō mujun 
tsuk  [Innocent in case of doubt: bringing it home; Declining guilty verdicts, contradictions in the 
evidence], FUKUI SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay 
Judge System] (Part 2), (Mar. 3, 2019) 19; M. Takeda, ‘Genbatsuka no ippō de yūyo ōku; ‘Kōi 
sekinin’ tettei, ryōkei ni haba [Increasing punitiveness and also probation; Bringing the 
‘responsibility for actions’ home, wide range in sentences], KYOTO SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in 
seido jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 3), (Mar. 23, 2019) 6; M. 
Takeda, Nagabiku hyōgi 13 jikan ni, chokusetsu shinri e, shōko heri shōnin baizō [The deliberations 
are dragging on to 13 hours, towards direct trials, fewer evidence, double as many witnesses], 
YAMAGATA SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay Judge 
System] (Part 4), (Apr. 25, 2019) 6; M. Takeda, Jitai ka kesseki 8 wari chikaku, shinri chōkika nado 
yōin: shuhi gimu keiken tsutaerarezu [Declining or default for more than 80 per cent, the extension 
of the deliberation as one of the contributing factors], KAHOKU SHIMPO, Kenshō Saiban’in seido 
jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 5), (May 22, 2019) 25. 
 11. Foote, supra note 8, 765. 
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appropriately harsh sentences for some persons convicted of sex crimes.12  It 
has led to more use of suspended sentences, which may encourage 
rehabilitation.13  And though the evidence is thin, it may have enriched trial 
deliberations about guilt and sentence by requiring judges to interact with 
citizens, who have different life experiences and perspectives than do their 
professional counterparts on the bench.14  More broadly, Japan’s lay judge 
reform is significant because it provided the opening for other major reforms 
in Japan’s criminal justice system, including the strengthening of the defense 
counsel function, expanded discovery, and increases in the electronic 
recording of interrogations.15 
One advocate for increasing lay participation in Japanese criminal 
justice has identified six significant procedural changes that were stimulated 
by the country’s lay judge reform.16  The first two refer to changes in defense 
lawyering that are invigorating an “unbalanced” adversary system that has 
long tilted toward the interests of the state.17 
 
(a) A new public defender system provides criminal suspects 
with legal representation before indictment (higisha 
kokusenbengo seido).  
 
 12. Foote, supra note 8, 766. 
 13. Foote, supra note 8, 766. 
 14. Foote, supra note 8, 767. 
 15. Foote, supra note 8, 773. 
 16. S. Shinomiya, Kokumin no shutaiteki, jisshitsuteki sanka wa jitsugen shiteiru ka: 
Saiban’in seido shikkō jūnen to kongo no kadai [Has the participation of the citizens in an 
independent and a substantial way become a reality?  One decade since the implementation of the 
lay judge system and future issues, (special issue: welcoming a decade of implementation of the 
lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (2019), 8-17. 
 17. M. FEELEY & S. MIYAZAWA, (EDS.), THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: 
CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS (Palgrave 2002).  As described by Takano and Takayama, 
two of Japan’s leading defense attorneys, the lay judge reform has had several positive effects on 
criminal defense, including these: (1) it has made trials less dependent on dossiers composed by 
police and prosecutors during pre-trial investigations in which defense lawyers are largely absent, 
and it has made trials more reliant on the direct and oral testimony of witnesses in open court; (2) 
it has made defense lawyers more active and aggressive in lay judge trials, a change that has had 
spill-over effects in non-lay judge trials; and (3) it has stimulated the creation of an improved 
system for the disclosure of evidence to the defense (T. Takano, Saiban’in seido no kōka: 10 nen o 
furikaette (tokushu saiban’in saiban shikkō 10 nen o mukaete) [The Impact of the Lay Judge 
System: Looking back on a Decade (special issue: welcoming a decade of implementation of the 
lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (May 2019) 18-29; I. Takayama, Hikokunin no tame no 
saiban’in saiban ga jitsugen dekiteiru ka: korekara no jūnen ni mukete jūnen o furikaeru (tokushu 
saiban’in saiban shikkō jūnen o mukaete) [Has the trial for the accused become a reality?  Looking 
back on a decade for the next decade (special issue: welcoming a decade of implementation of the 
lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (2019), 30-36.  On the prospects for change in Japanese 
criminal defense lawyering, see David T. Johnson, War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense 
Lawyers and Lay Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, Volume 9, Issue 
26 (June 29, 2011), pp. 1-11. 
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(b) There is increased specialization in criminal defense 
lawyering (keiji bengo no senmonka). 
(c) A more formal pretrial process was created, with expanded 
rights of discovery for defendants to the evidence in prosecutors’ 
possession (kōhan mae seiri tetsuzuki to shōko kaiji). 
(d) Lay judge trials proceed more continuously and rapidly 
than traditional trials did (renjitsu teki kaitei). 
(e) There is more reliance on the principles of “directness” 
and “orality” at trial, and there is less reliance on written dossiers 
as evidence (kōhan ni okeru chokusetsushugi—kōtōshugi no 
tettei). As a result, trials are easier to understand and more 
interesting to watch. 
(f) There is greater transparency in interrogations, largely 
because they are electronically recorded (torishirabe no kashika). 
 
The same analyst believes there have also been significant changes in 
Japan’s “judicial mindset” (saibankan no maindosetto no henka),18  with 
judges becoming less deferential to the interests of law enforcement.  In his 
view, this is the most important consequences of Japan’s lay judge reform, 
for the country’s judiciary has long taken a “conservative” stance on criminal 
justice issues.19  Indeed, the Japanese judiciary has “adopted, accepted or 
silently acquiesced in a wide range of interpretations that greatly 
circumscribed the protections for suspects and defendants, while granting 
broad authority to the investigators.”20  The presence of lay judges may be 
slowly transforming judicial sensibilities in ways that are making the 
criminal justice system more fair and just—especially to suspects and 
defendants. It will take many more years to make a sound assessment of the 
full effects of Japan’s lay judge reform, but in the long run this view might 
be right.  The fresh eyes of the amateur are important because, in law as in 
life, the more one looks at a thing, the less one is able to see it.  As G. K. 
Chesterton observed a century ago: 
 
It is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance 
of men.  But it is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as 
he can to other terrible things …  The horrible thing about all legal 
officials—even the best—about all judges, magistrates, barristers, 
detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of 
them are good), and not that they are stupid (several of them are 
 
 18. Shinomiya, 2019. 
 19. D. H. Foote, Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field, 
HŌSHAKAIGAKU, No. 72 (2010), 18. 
 20. Foote, 2010, 17-18. 
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quite intelligent).  It is simply that they have got used to it.  
Strictly, they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the 
usual man in the usual place.  They do not see the awful court of 
judgment; they only see their own workshop.21 
 
Lay participation in Japanese criminal justice could correct the judicial 
tendency to see “the awful court of judgment” as one’s own familiar 
workshop.22  And some defense lawyers seem to be realizing that in the 
presence of lay judges, they are no longer “talking to a wall.”23  They are 
even starting to “rattle the cages” of judicial interpretation that have long 
constrained the practice of criminal defense.24  Moreover, in Japan there have 
not been major reform failures of the kind that have been common in 
American criminal justice—and lay participation in Japan has not made 
things worse.25  In recognizing this we do not mean to damn Japan with faint 
praise.  From an American perspective, heeding the Hippocratic Oath—“first, 
do no harm”—by avoiding the potentially iatrogenic effects of reform is no 
small achievement.26 
Still, on the presently available evidence, after ten years of lay judge 
trials and “high praise and acclaim from nearly all quarters” for the effects 
of this reform,27 our conclusion is that there is more continuity than change 
in the “mindsets” and practices of Japanese judges and prosecutors.  As the 
next section describes, these legal professionals have circumscribed the 
influence of ordinary citizens in a variety of ways, much as legal 
professionals did in response to previous reforms (such as the prewar jury 
system) that aimed to establish meaningful forms of lay involvement.28  We 
want to stress (again) that it will take more time to discern the full effects of 
Japan’s lay participation reforms.  But if the proof of reform is mainly in the 
 
 21. G. K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES, 1909. 
 22. In 1914, one of Japan’s most famous novelists seemed to echo Chesterton’s insight. In an 
essay on art and experts, Natsume Sōseki noted that the senses of specialists eventually become 
dull, which is why they need the help of lay people, who “only get a clear view of Mount Fuji when 
standing far away from it.”  See N. Sōseki, Shirōto to Kurōto [Amateurs and Experts], in NATSUME 
SŌSEKI ZENSHŪ [NATSUME SŌSEKI’S COLLECTED WORKS] (Kadokawa Shoten, Volume 11, 7th 
edition, 1967), 224–255.  
 23. Johnson, 2011. 
 24. Johnson, 2011. 
 25. Malcolm M. Feeley, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Comments on the Contributions, 
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 27 (2017), 273, 292. 
 26. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (Basic 
Books, 1983). 
 27. M. J. WILSON, H. FUKURAI & T. MARUTA, JAPAN AND CIVIL JURY TRIALS: THE 
CONVERGENCE OF FORCES (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), p. 38. 
 28. DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE, JURIES IN THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CONTINUING 
STRUGGLE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY (Routledge, 2015), pp. 60-87. 
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pudding, then we need to conclude that not all that much has yet changed in 
Japanese criminal justice. 
 
The Limits of Form 
 
Evaluations of Japan’s lay participation reforms tend to converge on two 
main conclusions.  They are believed to have produced major changes in 
Japanese criminal justice, and the changes are seen as welcome and 
progressive.29  In our view, these assessments are too positive about the 
scope and impact of reform, and they tend to conflate process with substance. 
This section—the heart of our article—identifies ten ways in which Japan’s 
lay participation reforms are limited and problematic.30 
 
1.  A Sliver of Cases 
 
Japan’s Lay Judge Law states that lay judge panels shall hear cases in 
two categories: (a) crimes that are punishable by death, imprisonment for an 
indefinite period, or imprisonment with hard labor; and (b) crimes in which 
 
 29. There are dissenting views. For example, Igarashi Futaba argues that Japan’s lay judge 
system must confront “two crises” or it will become an empty and “hollowed out” reform: (a) the 
failure to provide adequate due process to criminal suspects and defendants, and (b) the failure to 
really reflect citizens’ opinions in criminal justice decision-making (F. Igarashi, Kō Naosanakereba 
Saiban’in Saiban wa Kūdō ni Naru (Gendaijinbunsha, 2016), pp. 3-15.  Similarly, Mark Levin 
argues that “the more things change [with respect to Japanese criminal justice], the more things 
stay the same” (Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est la Même Chose), and he concludes that Japanese 
criminal justice reform has taken “two steps forward and five steps backward” (Mark A. Levin, 
Considering Japanese Criminal Justice from an Original Position, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN 
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (J. Liu and S. Miyazawa eds.) Springer Series on Asian Criminology 
and Criminal Justice Research, (Springer, 2018), pp. 173-188).  And Matthew J. Wilson 
observes that lay judge trials occur in only a handful of cases, and officials seem inordinately 
interested in their “halo effect,” for they stress the public support lay judge trials have generated 
for Japanese criminal justice and the sense of efficacy people feel after serving as lay judges, while 
paying little attention to whether the lay judge system has actually shifted power relations among 
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys (M. J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact 
of Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal Trials in Japan, PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 
27 (2017) 102-104). Note, however, that Wilson also believes reform has brought important 
benefits to Japanese society.  As he summarizes, “From the outset, the creation and implementation 
of the lay judge system have been strongly controlled by the status quo such that direct impact on 
the outcome of individual criminal trials has been minimized.  However, the value of this 
monumental court reform in Japan has been educational, indirect, and real” (M. J. Wilson, 
Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal Trials in 
Japan, PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 27 (2017) 75).  In limit 10 of this section we will 
argue that the “educational” and “indirect” effects of Japan’s lay judge reform are far from 
“monumental.” 
 30. The ten limits of lay participation reform can be placed in three categories: problems 
inherent in the reforms (1 and 2), changes that consolidate the status quo (3, 7, and 8), and little or 
no change (4-6 and 9-10). 
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a victim has died because of an intentional criminal act.  These two 
categories might seem to constitute a large slice of Japan’s criminal justice 
pie, but it is actually just a sliver.  In 2017, for example, 1122 persons were 
charged with criminal offenses that were eligible for a lay judge trial.  This 
was 4 percent more than the 1077 persons similarly charged in 2016, but just 
1.6 percent of the total number of persons (69,674) charged with crimes in 
Japan in 2017 (see Table 1).  For every person indicted for a lay judge trial, 
approximately 60 people are indicted for non-lay judge trials. Global 
descriptions of change in “Japanese criminal justice” based on less than two 
percent of the system’s caseload are as dubious as accounts of life in San 
Francisco based on the lifestyles of the rich and famous Potrero Hill or 
Presidio Heights.  Similarly, predictions that the lay judge reform will have 
a “profound effect on Japanese criminal justice” fail to recognize that a sliver 
of a slice is not the whole pie.31 
 
TABLE 1 Ratio of Lay Judge Trial Indictments to Total Number of 










2009 1196 96,541   1.23 
2010 1797 91,322   1.96 
2011 1785 85,586   2.08 
2012 1457 83,823   1.84 
2013 1465 78,774   1.85 
2014 1393 77,405   1.79 
2015 1333 77,268   1.72 
2016 1077 73,060   1.47 
2017 1122 69,674   1.61 
 
 
 31. M. Inouye, 2018, p. 74. 
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Note: Lay Judge Trial Indictments are calculated from various reports published 
by Japan’s Supreme Court 裁判員制度の実施状況について【データ】[About the 
Implementation Status of the Lay Judge System: Data], retrieved at 
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/09_12_05-10jissi_jyoukyou.html; and 
total indictments are calculated from 犯罪⽩書  [White Paper on Crime], 
retrieved at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/65/nfm/n65_2_2_2_3_0.html#h2-2-3-
02, figure 2-2-3-02. 
 
 
Descriptions of Japan’s new trial system commonly claim that lay judge 
panels hear “serious criminal cases” or “heinous criminal cases” (or the like). 
This linguistic shorthand is handy, but it misstates the matter, for nearly all 
criminal cases are “serious” in the sense that they result in some combination 
of incarceration, fine, supervision, tracking, marking, stigmatization, or  
life disruption.32  In Japan, simply getting arrested can have catastrophic 
consequences—regardless of the offense severity, and even when arrest does 
not lead to indictment.  One pernicious myth about criminal justice is that 
“minor arrests and convictions are not especially terrible for the people who 
experience them.”33  In Japan as in the United States, this fiction is callous 
to the many people whose lives are adversely impacted by contact with the 
criminal process.  It also contributes to the tendency to conflate Japanese 
“criminal justice” with the “lay judge system,” for when the stakes are 
mistakenly seen to be low, why bother to discover what actually happens in 
the other criminal courthouses?  Most importantly, the myth of the “minor 
matter” functions to normalize the “punitive and vexatious” ways in which 
so-called “petty” (bizai) cases are processed in the nether regions of Japanese 
criminal justice, where lay judges do not serve and journalists and scholars 
seldom tread.34  Thanks to research by Japanese reporters and scholars, we 
now know a lot about how Japan’s lay judge system is operating.  But we 
need to be honest about our ignorance, too.  The truth is, we know little about 
how the rest of Japanese criminal justice system is (or is not) working.35  
Ignorance is ignorance, and no right to believe anything can be inferred  
from it. 
Lay judge trials are not only a small sliver of all criminal cases in Japan; 
they also do not adjudicate many of the country’s most serious crimes. In 
 
 32. A. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR 
SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE INEQUAL (Basic Books, 2018).  
 33. Id., at p. 19. 
 34. A. Peters, Some comparative observations on the criminal justice process in Holland and 
Japan, JOURNAL OF THE JAPAN-NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE 4 (1992) 247-294, 291. 
 35. Igarashi, 2016. 
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2016, all of the ten most frequently tried lay judge offenses were street 
crimes even though corporate crime, white-collar crime, and corruption  
are widely considered the country’s most serious crime problems.36  In this 
respect, the lay judge system reflects and reinforces a troubling dualism in 
Japanese criminal justice: police and prosecutors are enabled to “make 
crimes” against offenders for most ordinary street crimes,37 but they are 
disabled from holding accountable many of the country’s most powerful and 
harmful actors.38  And in this sense, lay judge trials reinforce Japan’s “legal 
cobweb,” which catches small flies but let’s wasps and hornets break through 
(to paraphrase Jonathan Swift in A Tritical Essay upon the Faculties of the 
Mind, 1707). 
Japan also has serious problems with sexual assault and other crimes of 
sexual violence and aggression.39  Yet another large lacuna in Japan’s lay 
judge system is the exclusion of most serious sex offenses from its 
jurisdiction.  In 2017, for example, there were 115 lay judge trials for 
“forcible indecency resulting in death or injury,” 75 lay judge trials for 
“sexual assault resulting in death or injury,” and 10 lay judge trials for 
“robbery-rape.”  In total, these 200 sex offenses comprise 18.6 percent of all 
lay judge trials (1077) in that year, but they represent only a small fraction 
of all serious sex crimes.40  In 2017, Japan’s Penal Code was revised to make 
the first significant changes in its sex crime provisions since 1907.  The 
revised Penal Code now defines various sex “crimes” under Articles 174-
179 and Articles 181 and 241, and “attempted [sex] crimes” (misuizai) under 
Articles 176-179.  But the only crimes eligible for lay judge trial are defined 
in Article 181 (forcible indecency resulting in death or injury) and Article 
 
 36. See, for example, ALAN S. MILLER & SATOSHI KANAZAWA, ORDER BY ACCIDENT: THE 
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFORMITY IN JAPAN (Westview Press, 2000), ch. 7; David T. 
Johnson, Kumo no Su ni Shōchō Sareru Nihonhō no Tokushoku (Japan’s Legal Cobweb), JURISUTO 
(The Jurist, Special Edition on the 50th Anniversary of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure, 
No. 1148 (January 1-15, 1999), pp. 185-189; DAG LEONARDSEN, CRIME IN JAPAN: PARADISE 
LOST? (Springer, 2010), p. 13; MATTHEW M. CARLSON & STEVEN R. REED, POLITICAL 
CORRUPTION AND SCANDALS IN JAPAN (Cornell, 2018).  
 37. SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME (SUNY Press, 
1992); DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 
(Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 33-42. 
 38. David T. Johnson, Kumo no Su ni Shōchō Sareru Nihonhō no Tokushoku, JŪRISUTO, No. 
1148 (January 1-15, 1999), pp. 185-189; David T. Johnson, Nihon no ‘Kumo no Su’ Shihō to 
Kensatsu no Katsudō, in KEIJI SHIHŌ O NINAU HITOBITO (Volume 3 in the series Keiji Shihō o 
Kangaeru, Iwanami Shoten, 2017) (Ibusuki Makoto et al. eds.), pp. 29-51. 
 39. CATHERINE BURNS, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN JAPAN (Routledge, 2005); ITOH 
SHIORI, BLACK BOX (Bungei Sunju, 2017). 
 40. Chizuko Ueno, 2018.  See also, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/5fbad0a 
24182-feature-feminist-scholar-calls-japans-gender-problem-human-disaster.html. 
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241 (robbery and forcible sexual intercourse resulting in death).41  In law, 
other sex offenses are not deemed sufficiently serious to qualify for lay judge 
trial.42  Until the Penal Code revision of 2017, “gang rape” (shudangōkanzai) 
was not eligible for lay judge trial, and neither was “robbery-rape” 
(gōtōgōkanzai) if the rape occurred before the robbery.  Even after the 2017 
revision, simple rape (“forced intercourse”) and “intercourse or indecent 
behavior by a custodian” (Article 179) remain ineligible for lay judge trial. 
As for crimes of sexual molestation (chikan), which are ubiquitous in 
Japan,43 the vast majority are excluded from lay judge trial because they are 
charged under local ordinances in which the maximum punishment is 
typically set at 1 year (as in Tokyo) or 6 months (as in many other 
prefectures). 
If lay judge trials are supposed to rely on “citizen sensibilities” for 
making judgments about “the most serious crimes,” then the exclusion of the 
vast majority of sex crimes from the new trial system illustrates the ironies 
and contradictions of Japan’s “legal cobweb.”44  Some commentators have 
argued for broadening the scope of lay judge trials, so as to encompass more 
cases (including sex crimes and white-collar offenses), but to date, most 
reform efforts have focused on narrowing the scope of eligible offenses, not 
expanding it.45 
 
2. Where Are the Police? 
 
Various labels have been used to characterize criminal justice in Japan. 
“Precise justice” (seimitsu shihō) and “prosecutor justice” (kensatsu shihō) 
are two of the most familiar,46 but “police justice” (keisatsu shihō) may be 
 
 41. Emails from Hakuoh University Professor of Law Mari Hirayama, July 26, 2019, and 
August 9, 2019. 
 42. Mari Hirayama, Lay judge decisions in sex crime cases: The most controversial area of 
saiban-in trials, YONSEI LAW JOURNAL, 3 (2012) 128; Mari Hirayama, A Future Prospect of 
Criminal Justice Policy for Sex Crimes in Japan-the Roles of the Lay Judge System There, in CRIME 
AND JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, (J. Liu & S. Miyazawa eds.) Springer Series on 
Asian Criminology and Criminal Justice Research (Springer, 2018), pp. 303-317. 
 43. SAITŌ AKIYOSHI, OTOKO GA CHIKAN NI NARU RIYŪ (Isuto Puresu, 2017). 
 44. David T. Johnson, Nihon no ‘Kumo no Su’: Shihō to Kensatsu Katsudō, in KEIJI SHIHŌ O 
NINAU HITOBITO, (Makoto Ibusuki et al. eds.) (Volume 3 in the series Keiji Shihō o Kangaeru; 
Mari Hirayama trans., Iwanami Shoten, 2017), pp. 29-51. 
 45. I. Takayama, Hikokunin no tame no saiban’in saiban ga jitsugen dekiteiru ka: korekara 
no jūnen ni mukete jūnen o furikaeru (tokushu saiban’in saiban shikkō jūnen o mukaete) [Has the 
trial for the accused become a reality? Looking back on a decade for the next decade (special issue: 
welcoming a decade of implementation of the lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (2019), pp. 
30-36. 
 46. One of the defining features of “precise justice” (seimitsu shihō) and “prosecutor justice” 
(kensatsu shihō) is reliance on detailed dossiers composed during pretrial investigations (David T. 
Johnson, 2002, pp. 264-275).  Although the lay judge reform has led to somewhat less reliance on 
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the most telling.47  Few democratic police forces are as powerful as the 
Japanese police. 48   It is hard to say exactly, but half or more of all  
discretion in Japanese criminal justice may be exercised by the police.49  In 
the aggregate, what police do with their discretion strongly shapes the 
content and quality of Japanese criminal justice.  In this context, it is striking 
how little attention has been directed at police in Japan’s justice reform 
movement generally, and in its lay participation reforms specifically. 
The fact that police seldom appear in Japan’s reform agenda is all the 
more remarkable because there have been many recent innovations aimed at 
making “lay and expert contributions” more salient and influential in 
Japanese criminal justice.50  These include not only the lay judge system, the 
victim participation system, and the reformed Prosecution Review 
Commissions (the main foci of this symposium), but also an enhanced role 
for forensic psychiatrists in making judgments about criminal insanity and 
diminished responsibility, the provision by social workers of more “support 
at the entrance” (iriguchi shien) for criminal suspects and defendants, and 
the increased involvement of scientists in criminal justice fact-finding, 
especially in assessing DNA and other forensic evidence.51  Japan’s recent 
lay participation innovations also include a “boom” in crime prevention 
activities by citizen volunteers.52  Yet despite this flurry of reform, there has 
been little effort to make Japanese police more responsive and accountable 
to the public that they ostensibly serve. 
Citizen oversight of police has proven effective in other countries.53  In 
this sense, police may be the biggest winner in Japan’s justice system reform 
movement.  They do not want their position—much power and little 
accountability—to change, and they are getting what they want, largely 
because they have been able to limit the scope of the political process to 
 
dossiers (Masahiro Takeda, 2019b), many defense lawyers maintain that they continue to play too 
large a role in criminal trials (Takano Takashi, 2019; I. Takayama, 2019). 
 47. David T. Johnson, Nihon ni okeru Shihō Seido Kaikaku: Keisatsu no Shozai to Sono 
Jūyōsei [Justice System Reform in Japan: Where Are the Police and Why It Matters], HŌRITSU 
JIHŌ, Volume 76, No. 2 (February 2004), pp. 8-15. 
 48. Setsuo Miyazawa, 1992; David T. Johnson, Retention and reform in Japanese capital 
punishment, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 49 (2015) 853. 
 49. On the broad scope of police discretion in the United States, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (University of Illinois Press, 1969). 
 50. ERIK HERBER, LAY AND EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS TO JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(Routledge, 2019). 
 51. Herber, 2019. 
 52. Erik Herber, Crime prevention in Japan: orchestration, representation, and the impact of 
a volunteering boom, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW, CRIME AND JUSTICE, 54 (2018), pp. 102-
110. 
 53. SAMUEL E. WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY (Sage, 2018).  
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consideration of those reform issues that are innocuous to them.54  And 
police power has long been evident in Japanese criminal justice reform.  In 
2001, eight years before lay judge trials started, Toshiki Odanaka observed 
that important police issues were missing in the reform agenda.  As he put it: 
 
The opinion [of the Justice System Reform Council] stresses 
the primary importance of a fair and rapid sentence but dismisses 
the importance of a just procedure.  Although the JSRC pursued 
the expansion of investigation methods such as criminal immunity 
and securing witness cooperation, it clearly states that it will not 
direct efforts at the improvement of the police detention system 
(including “substitute prisons,” or daiyo kangoku) or police 
investigations …  This is … the result of a political calculation 
driven by ambition for power …  The reform of justice described 
in the [JSRC’s] opinion paper is obviously regressive against the 
background of constitutional principles such as the protection of 
human rights, the guarantee of independent justice, the right to a 
fair trial, and the right to fair procedures.55 
 
By keeping the issues of police power, performance, and accountability 
outside the realm of public discussion, the constricted scope of criminal 
justice reform in Japan illustrates a general truth about the roles played by 
power and rationality in the reform process.  As other studies have shown, 
power has the capacity to define “reality” by producing knowledge that is 
useful to it and by suppressing knowledge for which it has no use.56  Since 
 
 54. P. Bachrach & M. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 
56.4 (1962) 941-952. 
 55. See T. Odanaka, Kompan no shihō seido kaikaku no ‘gyakukaikaku’ teki honshitsu [The 
“Counter-Reformative” Essence of Today’s Judicial Reforms], HŌ TO MINSHUSHUGI, 360 (July 
2001), pp. 36-38; and see Dimitri Vanoverbeke, 2015, p. 133 (quoting Odanaka).  Concerns about 
the police being overlooked and ignored by journalists and researchers were also expressed in Suo 
Masayuki’s trenchant analysis of his experiences on a criminal justice reform commission (hōsei 
shingikai) called the “Special Committee on Criminal Justice for a New Era” (shinjidai no keiji 
shihō seido tokubetsu bukai).  See M. SUO, SORE DEMO BOKU WA KAIGI DE TATAKAU: 
DOKYUMENTO KEIJI SHIHŌ KAIKAKU [EVEN SO I WILL FIGHT IN COMMITTEE: REPORTAGE ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM] (Iwanami Shoten, 2015).  Although this book is a harshly critical 
examination of Japan’s reform process, in a 2019 interview Suo expressed positive views about the 
effects of lay participation, saying “I had hoped the lay judge reform would go well, but there are 
aspects of it that are going even better than I expected, and some things [in Japanese criminal 
justice] have improved dramatically.”  A summary of Suo’s views even states that there has been 
“great progress” (daishinpo) in Japanese criminal justice as a result of the lay judge reform.  See 
the interview by Otani Akihiro, in Fuji News Network & Tōkai Terebi (Aug. 17, 2019), https:// 
www.fnn.jp/posts/00047349HDK/201909301712_THK_HDK?fbclid=IwAR3TWszdd_VgD524-
BfibWCCav5D0yo0JUMn1ebzdm8dvJR6S1IkPBxogjo (retrieved October 20, 2019).  
 56. BENT FLYVBJERG, RATIONALITY AND POWER: DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE (University of 
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at least the time of the Occupation (1945-1952), Japanese police have been 
extraordinarily successful at producing rationalizations that serve their 
interest and suppressing rationality that would challenge their position of 
primacy in criminal justice.57  Despite many lay participation reforms in 
recent years, this crucial fact has not changed.58  This limit of reform and the 
next one (on prosecutors) suggest that lay participation reforms have had 
relatively little impact on some of Japanese law enforcement’s most 
fundamental features. 
 
3. An Abundance of Prosecutorial Caution 
 
One axiom about criminal court reform is that it matters how reforms are 
implemented. Another is that court reform routinely has unintended 
consequences.59  The most important consequence of Japan’s lay judge reform 
concerns how prosecutors have tried to implement and resist it—with an 
abundance of charging caution.  Although many Japanese reformers did not 
anticipate this result, in retrospect it seems unsurprising, for prosecutors have 
long used their discretion to control the inputs into Japan’s criminal 
courtrooms, and they are reluctant to relinquish this gatekeeper role.60 
From January to May of 2019, Kyodo News journalist Masahiro Takeda 
wrote a series of five newspaper articles entitled “Ten Years of the Lay Judge 
 
Chicago Press, 1998), p. 36.  
 57. Christopher Aldous& F. Leishman, Policing in post-war Japan: reform, reversion and 
reinvention, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, 25.2 (1997), pp. 135-154. 
 58. One consequence of marginalizing police in Japan’s reform process is a continued reliance 
on confessions in the criminal justice system (D. H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in 
Japan, GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (1991) 415; Miyazawa, 
1992).  But there have been noteworthy changes as well. For example, more criminal suspects and 
defendants are invoking their right to remain silent.  The length of interrogations has declined in 
recent years.  And as of June 2019, interrogations must be recorded in all cases involving lay judges. 
Despite significant loopholes, the recording requirement increases the transparency of a police (and 
prosecutor) practice that has long been problematic (D. Johnson, 2002, ch.8).  At the same time, 
electronic recording creates a new concern, that video evidence of the interrogation process will 
“mislead” lay judge panels (Makoto Ibusuki, The Dark Side of Visual Recording in the Suspect 
Interview: An Empirical and Experiential Study of the Unexpected Impact of Video Images, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW, 2019, pp. 1-17, at https://link.springer. 
com/article/10.1007%2Fs11196-019-09645-0), and “over-influence” their decisions (Toshikuni 
Murai and Keiichi Muraoka, www.nippon.com, June 26, 2019, https://www. nippon.com/en/japan-
topics/c05402/citizens-on-the-bench-assessing-japan%E2%80%99s-lay-jud ge-system.html).  The 
use of video recordings in the “Imaichi” kidnap-murder trial in Utsunomiya District Court 
illustrates the potentially pro-law enforcement effects of Japan’s recording reform (Setsuo 
Miyazawa & Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the Lessons of the 
Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making in Japan, PACIFIC RIM LAW 
& POLICY JOURNAL, 27 (2017) 149). 
 59. Feeley, 1983. 
 60. Johnson, 2002. 
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System” (Saiban’in Seido 10 nen).  The first article in this series makes his 
most important point—one he has been making for several years.61 Its title 
is “Crimes Often Reduced as Charge Rate Declines: Some See Prosecutor 
Caution as ‘Tight-Assed’” (“‘Zaimei-ochi’ Hinpatsu Kisoritsu Teika: 
Kensatsu Shinchō ‘Shirigomi’ Shiteki mo”).62  In this article, Takeda observes 
that in 2004 (the year the Lay Judge Law was passed), 3800 criminal cases 
would have been eligible for lay judge trial.  In the same year, the Justice 
System Reform Council said it expected there to be approximately 3000 lay 
judge trials per year after the Law took effect in 2009.  That prediction badly 
missed the mark. In fact, only 2133 criminal cases were eligible for lay judge 
trial in 2009, and by 2016 the number had fallen to 1122—less than 30 
percent of the number that would have been eligible in 2004. 
There are two main reasons for this large drop in the number of cases 
eligible for lay judge trial.  First, crime rates in Japan have declined. From 
2004 to 2017, the homicide rate declined by 36 percent, the robbery rate 
declined by 76 percent, and the total number of Penal Code offenses declined 
by 73 percent.  These and other crimes declined partly because of 
demographics: the graying of Japanese society means there are fewer young 
people in the crime-prone years.  The second reason for the sharp decline in 
the number of “object cases for lay judge trial” (saiban’in saiban no taishō 
jiken) is increased “prosecutor caution” (kensatsu shinchō), which comes in 
two types: (a) charging cases received from the police lightly, by reducing 
the offense severity (zaimei-ochi jiken); and (b) not charging cases at all (kiso 
 
 61. M. Takeda, 2019a. 
 62. M. Takeda, 2019a = “‘Zaimei ochi’ hinpatsu, kisoritsu teika” [‘Charge Rate Reduced’ 
Frequent, Declining Indictment Rate], Kōchi Shimbun, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: 
One Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 1), (January 30, 2019), p. 12.  Consider three Japanese 
expressions that have been used to criticize prosecutorial caution in charging cases for lay judge 
trial. First, the Japanese characters for “shirigomi” (尻込み) literally mean “tight ass” or “closed 
ass”, and they are often translated into English as “hesitate” or “flinch.”  This is one way of 
disparaging the timid and fainthearted. Second, the perception that Japanese prosecutors are too 
timid about charging cases has led some scholars and reporters to call them “cowards” (okubyō = 
臆病 ; authors’ interviews, 2009-2019). Third, a prominent Japanese defense lawyer (Takashi 
Takano) calls prosecutors “weak-willed” (hetare = ヘタレ) because of their excessively cautious 
approach to charging cases that could be eligible for lay judge trial (David T. Johnson & Setsuo 
Miyazawa, Japanese Court Reform on Trial, in THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THE PROMISE OF 
JUSTICE: STUDIES INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MALCOLM FEELEY, Rosann Greenspan, Hadar 
Aviram, and Jonathan Simon eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2019) pp. 122-138).  In Takano’s 
view, an excess of prosecutorial prudence undermines the point of the lay judge trial, which is to 
give citizens a significant say in making criminal justice decisions.  As defined in the Urban 
Dictionary, “hetare” is anime slang signifying “an inept and mentally unstable character” who 
frequently worries about “something benign.”  English synonyms include “baby balls” and 
“nebbish.” 
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ga miokurareta jiken).  The numbers are striking.63  In 2006, Japanese prosecutors 
charged 57.0 percent of all homicide cases that were sent to their office.  By 
2009 the figure had fallen to 48.6 percent, and by 2017 it had dropped to 28.2 
percent.  The drop in the charge rate (kisoritsu) for arson of a dwelling is 
similarly sharp.  The “charge rate” for robbery with injury fell from 79.9 
percent in 2006 to 32.8 percent in 2013—a decline of nearly three-fifths.  As 
for sex offenses, the charge rate for rape leading to injury or death dropped 
from 69.7 percent in 2006 to 43.7 percent in 2017.64  A similar increase in 
prosecutorial caution is evident in the percentage of cases that prosecutors 
charge “as is” (sōken zaimei kisoritsu): that is, the percentage of cases that 
prosecutors charge with the same crime that was alleged in the paperwork 
received from the police.  For homicide (including attempts), the “as-is” 
charge rate fell from 40.6 percent in 2006, to 32.9 percent in 2009, to 21.3 
percent in 2017.  The “as-is” charge rate for homicide in 2017 was only about 
half what it was 11 years earlier. 
  
 
 63. Takeda, 2019a.  
 64. As for sex offenses that are not eligible for lay judge trial, the charge-rate (kisoritsu) drop 
for rape (gōkan) fell from about 60 percent in 2005 to 34.7 percent in 2014, while the charge rate 
for forcible obscenity (kyōsei waisetsu) fell from over 50 percent to 40.7 percent over the same 
period of time.  In 2018-2019, the Japanese media harshly criticized Japanese courts for acquitting 
some criminal defendants who had been charged with sex crimes, but as these statistics suggest, 
the main problems with the handling of sex crime cases in Japanese criminal justice is excessive 
prosecutorial caution and an “epidemic of disbelief” among Japanese police and prosecutors 
regarding the statements made by victims (Mikio Kawai, Seihanzai Muzai Hanketsu, Hontō no 
Mondaiten wa Nani ka, ASAHI RONZA, May 15, 2019).  In these respects Japan resembles the 
United States (Barbara Bradley Hagerty, An Epidemic of Disbelief, THE ATLANTIC, August 2019, 
at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/an-epidemic-of-disbelief/592807/?). 
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2000 86,897  
 
63,962 57.6 
2001  93,286 70,780 56.9 
2002 100,913 81,376 55.4  
2003 105,375 92,494 53.3  
2004 110,193 110,346 50.0 
2005 109,441 124,184 46.8 
2006 110,298 142,852 43.6 
2007 102,993 133,196 43.6 
2008  98,570 123,457 44.4 
2009  96,541 123,184 43.9 
2010  91,322 123,591 42.5 
2011  85,586 118,802 41.9 
2012  83,823 122,269 40.7 
2013  78,774 123,672 38.9 
2014  77,405 123,887 38.5 
2015  77,268 120,522 39.1 
2016  73,060 118,115 38.2 
 
Note: Figures are calculated from annual 犯罪⽩書 [White Paper on Crime], 
retrieved at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/65/nfm/n65_2_2_2_3_0.html#h2-2-3-
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Japan’s executive prosecutors claim that because charge rates started 
declining before lay judge trials started in 2009, the lay judge system cannot 
be its cause.  We disagree.  Prosecutors are charging cases in the shadow of 
lay judge trials, and they have been doing so since before 2009.  “Mock lay 
judge trials” (mogi saiban’in saiban) started soon after the Lay Judge Law 
was enacted in 2004, and prosecutors soon realized that lay judge panels 
were less likely to give them what they want than were the panels of 
professional judges that they were accustomed to.  Prosecutors adjusted their 
charging standards accordingly, by becoming more cautious.  They were 
adapting in order to conform to a norm that has long governed their behavior: 
“a case should not be charged if the court might wonder about its judgment” 
(saibansho ga handan ni mayou jiken wa kiso shinai). 
To some observers, the most fundamental change in Japanese criminal 
justice is the “mindset” of professional judges, and the main reason for this 
change is the presence of lay judges.65  But if there have been changes in 
judicial sensibilities, they are being at least partly offset by changes in 
prosecutor practice.  Most notably, prosecutors have become significantly 
more cautious about what crimes to charge—and therefore about what kinds 
of cases lay judge panels will adjudicate.  As we will explain below, 
prosecutors have also become more cautious about what sentences to seek.  
Some critics contend that by becoming more cautious, prosecutors are 
limiting the role lay judges can play and thereby undermining a reform  
that was meant to give citizens more influence in the criminal process.66 
Prosecutors are also doing what legal professionals have done several times 
in the past when Japan tried to introduce lay participation into its legal 
system: they are minimizing the role lay people can play in determining case 
outcomes.67  In these respects, prosecutors are trying to maintain control over 
case outcomes by minimizing the influence of amateurs and outsiders.  If 
this pronounced prosecutorial prudence continues for another decade or two 
(and if crime in Japan continues to decline), the lay judge system could 
become starved for cases, much as the prewar jury system was.68 
Yet the prosecution issues are complicated, because more cautious 
charging policies also tends to mean less use of the criminal sanction.  For 
progressives who believe the criminal sanction has limited capacity to do 
good and great capacity to do harm, the timidity of “tight-assed” prosecutors 
 
 65. Shinomiya, 2019. 
 66. Takano, 2019; Takeda, 2019a. 
 67. Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay participation in the Japanese justice system: A  
few preliminary thoughts regarding the lay assessor system (saiban-in seido) from domestic 
historical and international psychological perspectives, VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 37 (2004) 935; 
Vanoverbeke, 2015. 
 68. Vanoverbeke, 2015.  
6 - Johnson 7/29/2020  10:19 AM 
456 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:3 
could be a welcome development.  At the same time, an abundance of 
prosecutorial caution may be denying the new trial system the cases it needs 
to show that trials can be more than empty rituals which “ratify” what law 
enforcement wants.69  Whatever one thinks about these normative issues, one 
conclusion seems clear: For better and for worse, prosecutors continue to 
control case inputs in Japanese criminal justice.  In this way, they largely 
determine what case outputs will be.  
 
4. Conviction Rates 
 
Another manifestation of prosecutorial caution and criminal justice 
continuity can be seen in Japan’s conviction rates, which have remained high 
in the lay judge era, largely because (as explained above) prosecutors have 
become more cautious about what cases to charge for lay judge 
adjudication.70  In the three years before lay judge trials started (2006-2008), 
the conviction rate in criminal cases that (if they had occurred at a later date) 
would have been eligible for lay judge trial was 99.4 percent.  Thus, before 
the 2009 reform, 1 criminal trial in 167 ended in acquittal.  In the first 10 
years after the reform (May 2009 through December 2018), the lay judge 
conviction rate was 99.1 percent, which means that approximately 1 criminal 
trial in 111 has ended in acquittal in the lay judge era.71 
Some believe this is a significant decline,72 and their claim deserves 
consideration.  As the lay judge system matures, the conviction rate could be 
slowly eroding—we would need several more years of data in order to be 
sure.73  In the three most recent years for which evidence is available (2016-
 
 69. R. Hirano, Diagnosis of the current code of criminal procedure, LAW IN JAPAN, 22 (1989) 
129; Takano, 2019. 
 70. Takeda, 2019b. 
 71. Takeda, 2019b. 
 72. Takeda, 2019b. 
 73. If the conviction rate is declining, one contributing cause is defense attorneys, who have 
become more aggressive and adept at doing criminal defense (Johnson, 2011; Takano, 2019; 
Takayama, 2019).  According to prosecutor Kikuchi Hiroshi, two leading indicators of 
improvement in Japanese defense lawyering are an increase in the number of cases in which 
defendants deny the charges against them (hinin jiken), and an increase in the frequency with which 
suspects and defendants exercise their right to silence (mokuhiken).  H. Kikuchi, Saiban’in saiban 
seido shikkō 10 nen o furikaette: kensatsu no tachiba kara (tokushū saiban’in saiban seido shikkō 
10 nen no keiki ni kangaeru) [Reflecting on the Lay Judge Trial System in Effect for One Decade], 
in KEISATSU RONSHŪ, 72.6 (2019), pp. 29-53.  As a prominent defense lawyer put it, “In this era 
of recording interrogations (kashika jidai), it has become easier to carry through the right to silence. 
Hence, when we defense attorneys consider the most appropriate strategy for our clients, we first 
and foremost consider the right to silence.  The result is that we advise suspects and defendants to 
exercise their right to silence more frequently” (defense lawyer Gotō Sadato quoted in: Y. Gōda, 
Saiban’in saiban seido shikkō 10 nen toiu sujime ni omou koto [What to Think a the Milestone of a 
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2018), the lay judge conviction rate was 98.4 percent,74 compared to 99.4 
percent for 2006-2008.  In this interval, 1 defendant in 63 was acquitted, and 
acquittals were 2.7 times more likely than they were in the three years 
preceding the advent of lay judge trials.  
The recent decline in propensity to convict has been hailed as evidence 
that lay judge panels are “thoroughly implementing” a principle that has long 
been respected in the breach by Japan’s criminal courts: that “defendants 
should receive the benefit of the doubt” when there is reasonable doubt about 
the evidence.75  But in our view, there is more continuity than change with 
respect to conviction rates.  First, when 98 or 99 defendants in 100 are being 
convicted at trial, it seems fair to say that the conviction rate remains 
“extremely high”—as it has been for decades in Japan.76  Second, when lay 
judge trials constitute less than 2 percent of all criminal trials in Japan (“a 
sliver of cases”), a small decline in the lay judge conviction rate has no 
discernable effect on the overall conviction rate.  Third, 40 percent (39/99) 
of all the acquittals that occurred in the first ten years of Japan’s new trial 
system were issued for one kind of crime—trafficking in methamphetamines 
—even though these cases constituted only 7.9 percent of all lay judge trials 
during that decade.  Acquittals for methamphetamine trafficking are five 
times more common than the meth caseload would predict (40/7.9 = 5).  If 
Japanese prosecutors become more careful about charging meth cases (and 
we expect they will), this crime-specific acquittal rate will fall in the future. 
Finally, in the first 10 years of the lay judge system, there were 99 acquittals: 
about 10 per year, on the average.  Ten of the 99 (10 percent) were overturned 
by High Courts after prosecutors appealed.77  Prosecutors are appealing lay 
 
Decade that the Saiban’in Trial System in in Effect], in KEISATSUGAKU RONSHŪ, 72.6 (2019), pp. 
1-27 and 35. 
 74. Takeda, 2019b. 
 75. Takeda, 2019b. 
 76. Johnson, 2002, p. 215.  For example, Germany’s conviction rate in 2013 was 85 percent, 
and in most recent years it has ranged between 85 percent and 90 percent.  See J. M. JEHLE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN GERMANY: FACTS AND FIGURES (Forum Verlag Godesberg GmbH, 2015).  
Among defendants charged with a felony in American state courts, 68 percent were convicted (59 
percent of a felony and the remainder of a misdemeanor), with felony conviction rates higher for 
defendants originally charged with motor vehicle theft (74 percent), driving-related offenses (73 
percent), murder (70 percent), burglary (69 percent), and drug trafficking (67 percent); conviction 
rates were lower for defendants originally charged with assault (45 percent).  See U.S. Bureau of 
Statistics Office of Justice Programs, at https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=403 (retrieved 
August 23, 2019).  In India, the world’s largest democracy, the conviction rate in the megalopolis 
of Mumbai ranged from 18 percent to 25 percent before falling to “an all-time low of 4 percent in 
2000.”  See S. MEHTA, MAXIMUM CITY: BOMBAY LOST AND FOUND (Vintage, 2004), 175. 
 77. In addition to the 10 lay judge acquittals that Japan’s High Courts overturned from 2009 
to 2018, they also changed 17 “guilty” verdicts (out of 11,429) to “not guilty” (Takeda, 2019b). Of 
course, not all acquittals and convictions are appealed, but the contrast is still striking: 1 acquittal 
in 10 is overturned on appeal, compared with 1 conviction in 667.  The fact that Japanese appellate 
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judge acquittals less aggressively than they did in the pre-reform period, 
partly out of respect for the principle that legal professionals should defer to 
the decisions made by lay participants, as articulated by the Tokyo High 
Court in 2013 and by Japan’s Supreme Court in 2014.78  Nonetheless, a 10 
percent reversal rate for acquittals on appeal is significant in a system in 
which the 60 courts (50 District Courts and 10 branch courts) that hold lay 
judge trials produce less than a dozen acquittals per year. 79   When a 
substantial proportion of these 60 courts have not issued a single acquittal in 
the first decade of the new trial system, the slight uptick in the number of 
not-guilty verdicts does not seem very significant. 
 
5. PRCs and Mandatory Prosecution 
 
In 2009, a reform of Japan’s Prosecution Review Commission Law of 
1948 enabled panels of 11 citizens on the country’s 201 Prosecution Review 
Commissions (PRCs) to institute “mandatory prosecution” (kyōsei kiso) in 
some cases.  On paper, this reform appears to address the problem of 
excessive charging caution summarized in the preceding paragraphs, for it 
provides a way for lay people to override the non-charge decisions of 
professional prosecutors. Some scholars expected this reform to have large 
effects.  One predicted that “the new binding power bestowed upon the PRC 
can exert a significant authority over, and insert public sentiments and 
equitable judgments into, prosecutorial decisions on politically sensitive 
cases or controversial issues that may affect the broader public interest. In 
addition, the PRC can help expose the fortified terrain of special protection 
and immunity given by the Japanese government to influential political 
heavyweights, high-ranking bureaucrats, and business elites.”80   On this 
view, PRCs have “become an important channel through which ordinary 
people’s moral sentiments—their sense of justice, fairness, and 
accountability—can be expressed, articulated, and reflected in the 
 
courts find so much more error in not-guilty verdicts than in convictions is further testament to their 
essentially “conservative” nature (Foote, 2010, p. 8).  The 66 to 1 disparity also reflects the 
tendency of District Courts to convict in the first place, for (with few exceptions) it is trial losers 
who file appeals—and Japanese prosecutors seldom lose. 
 78. Takeda, 2019b. 
 79. Takeda, 2019b.  
 80. Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative Agents of 
Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, CHI.-KENT L. 
REV., 102.70 (2011), 4; see also, C. F. Goodman, Prosecution Review Commissions, the Public 
Interest, and the Rights of the Accused: The Need for a ‘Grown Up’ in the Room, PACIFIC RIM LAW 
& POLICY JOURNAL, 22.1 (2013), 1-48; and H. Fukurai & Z. Wang, Proposal to Establish the 
Federal Civil Grand Jury System in America: Effective Civic Oversight of Federal Agencies and 
Government Personnel, JOURNAL OF CIVIL & LEGAL SCIENCES, 3 (2014) 1-6. 
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deliberation of criminal cases.”81 
In reality, Japan’s reformed PRCs are almost “all hat and no cattle,”82 
for they have had little effect on prosecutorial practice, as empirical  
research shows.83  The two most fundamental research findings are that few 
complaints about nonprosecution are brought to PRCs in the first place, and 
few of the complaints that are brought result in recommendations to 
prosecute or mandatory prosecution.84  Hence, the net effect of the PRC 
reform is little impact on the policies or practices of Japanese prosecutors. 
What is more, the rarity of PRC challenges to prosecutors’ non-charge 
decisions (only 9 cases of mandatory prosecution in the first 10 years) and 
the low rate of conviction after mandatory prosecution (just 2 of the first 13 
defendants were convicted, for a conviction rate of 15 percent) may vindicate 
the view of professional prosecutors that their non-charge decisions are 
appropriate and that most cases of mandatory prosecution were wrong to 
override their professional judgment. 
Japan’s reformed PRCs could also be described as “all bark and no bite,” 
except that even after the 2009 reform there has been little “bark.” Consider 
two examples: one involving crimes of the powerful, which were supposed 
to be a main focus of PRC review,85 and the other involving a rape case that 
received little media coverage in Japan.86 
 
 81. Fukurai, 2011, p. 42. 
 82. This Texas expression refers to big talk without action, power, or substance (see 
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/all_hat_and_no_cattle).  
 83. David T. Johnson & Mari Hirayama, Japan’s Reformed Prosecution Review Commission: 
Changes, Challenges, and Lessons, ASIAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY, 14.2 (June 2019), 77-102. 
 84. Empirical research on Japan’s reformed PRCs has reached at least nine findings: (1) Few 
cases are reviewed by the reformed PRCs. (2) There has been no post-reform increase in the number 
of cases reviewed by the reformed PRCs. (3) There have been few PRC recommendations to charge 
cases that prosecutors originally decided not to charge. (4) Most cases reviewed by PRCs are 
relatively low salience. (5) Some of prosecutors’ non-charge categories (such as “no suspicion” and 
“no crime”) seem protected from PRC review, which may create a perverse incentive for 
prosecutors to put some non-charge cases in these protected categories. (6) Reformed PRCs have 
issued few policy recommendations to executive prosecutors (kenjisei). (7) There are few PRC-
inspired trials, and when such trials do occur, the outcomes for defendants tend to be lenient. (8) In 
PRC-inspired trials, there have been more acquittals after the 2009 reform than before it, which 
suggests that occasionally prosecutors do charge more aggressively when facing the prospect of 
mandatory prosecution. (9) In the first 9 cases of mandatory prosecution, involving a total of 13 
defendants, only 2 defendants were convicted, and both received light punishment: a fine of 9000 
yen ($90) for one, and a one-year prison term suspended for three years for the other.  For more on 
the effects of Japan’s PRC reform, see Johnson & Hirayama, 2019, pp. 77-102.  
 85. Kawai Mikio, Kiso Sōto o Daseru koto ga Keiji Shihō Kaikaku no Pointo, ASAHI RONZA, 
Aug. 11, 2015.  
 86. David McNeill, Justice Postponed: Itoh Shiori and Rape in Japan, ASIA-PACIFIC 
JOURNAL, Volume 16, Issue 15, Number 1 (Aug. 1, 2018), pp. 1-6, at https://apjjf.org/2018/15/ 
McNeill.html.  
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In March 2019, a PRC in Osaka ruled that “non-prosecution is 
inappropriate” (fukiso futō) after the Special Investigation Division 
(tokusōbu) of the Osaka District Prosecutors Office decided not to charge 38 
people (including former Ministry of Finance senior bureaucrat Nobuhisa 
Sagawa) in the Moritomo Gakuen cronyism scandal that implicated the wife 
and the administration of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe.  Many observers 
criticized the Osaka PRC for not ruling that “prosecution is appropriate” 
(kiso sōto), which would have put considerably more pressure on prosecutors 
to charge than its decision that “non-prosecution is inappropriate,” and which 
also would have maintained the possibility of mandatory prosecution if 
prosecutors decided not to charge for a second time.  In August 2019, 
prosecutors in Osaka did just that, resulting in the non-prosecution of 10 
people who had supposedly been “reinvestigated.”87  In this case as in many 
other corruption cases in postwar Japan, prosecutors “let the wicked 
sleep”88—and PRCs did little to hold them accountable.  Indeed, when an 
Osaka NGO (the Citizens Committee to Raise Voices for a Healthy State 
Ruled by Law, Kenzen na Hōchi Kokka no tame ni Koe o Ageru Shimin no 
Kai) asked an Osaka PRC to disclose documents that their PRC counterparts 
in Tokyo had disclosed in previous cases, the Osaka PRC refused to disclose 
many documents and blacked out almost all of the words on the documents 
that they did disclose.  The NGO also noted how strange it was for all of the 
case work in the big Moritomo case to be performed by just one of the four 
PRCs in Osaka. In these ways, the non-prosecutions in the Moritomo case 
raise serious questions about the independence and integrity of Japanese 
prosecutors and of the reformed PRCs.89  We need more research on this 
subject. 
There was also a puzzling degree of PRC passivity in the rape case 
involving a freelance journalist named Shiori Itō and Noriyuki Yamaguchi, 
a prominent TV journalist and the biographer and friend of Prime Minister 
Shinzō Abe.  Despite considerable evidence that Yamaguchi had raped Itō 
in May 2015 (perhaps after giving her a “date rape drug”), including hotel 
 
 87. Osaka Prosecutors Close Moritomo Gakuen Case after Reconfirming No Bureaucrats 
Will Be Indicted over Scandal, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019), at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ 
news/2019/08/10/national/crime-legal/osaka-prosecutors-close-moritomo-gakuen-case-reconfirmin 
g-no- bureaucrats-will-indicted-scandal/#.Xbf-yi2ZM_U. 
 88. David T. Johnson, Why the Wicked Sleep: The Prosecution of Political Corruption in 
Postwar Japan, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Volume 24, No. 4 (2000), pp. 59-77. 
 89. See N. Kataoka, Moritomo Jiken meguri Shimin Dantai ga Kaiken: ‘Osaka Kensatsu 
Shinsakai no Fukaiji wa Ijō’ [Citizen Group’s Press Conference about the Moritomo Incident: The 
Osaka Prosecutor Review Commission’s Decision not to Disclose is Not Normal] (Shūkan Kinyō 
Onrain, YAHOO, Aug. 20, 2019), at https://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/article?a=20190820-00010000-
kinyobi-soci; and N. Yagi, Sōzō no Nanamejō o Kite Kureta Ōsaka Kensatsu Shinsakai no Kaiji 
[The decision by the Osaka Prosecutor Review Commission is above and beyond imagination] 
(BLOGOS, July 17, 2019), https://blogos.com/article/391856/. 
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surveillance video of a stumbling Itō, the testimony of a taxi driver who had 
driven Itō and Yamaguchi to the hotel, and Itō’s repeated statements about 
inexplicably falling unconscious and waking up with Yamaguchi on top of 
and inside her, a PRC in Tokyo upheld the decision of Tokyo prosecutors 
not to prosecute Yamaguchi.90  The criminal case died there, though at the 
time of this writing in November 2019, Itō’s civil lawsuit against Yamaguchi 
is ongoing. 
In our view, the main lesson to learn from the non-prosecutions in the 
Moritomo Gakuen and Shiori Itō cases is that Japan’s PRCs remain  
as passive and pusillanimous after the 2009 reform91 as before it.92  The 
acquittal of three TEPCO executives on September 19, 2019, will do nothing 
to make this watchdog more likely to bark or bite.93  Indeed, the results of 
their mandatory prosecution for “professional negligence resulting in death 
and injury” as a result of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in March 2011 
may increase calls to restrict the powers of Japan’s reformed PRCs.94  Some 
analysts even argue that government officials or legal professionals should 
be given authority to train and supervise PRCs, in order to prevent 
“inappropriate” acts of mandatory prosecution that damage the public 
interest or “game” the criminal process for political advantage.95  In our 
view, this reform—as one analyst advocates, putting a “grown up” in the 
PRC room—could reproduce the problem that has long plagued efforts to 
implement lay participation in Japanese criminal justice.  Several times in 
the past century, Japan’s government officials and legal professionals have 






 90. Itoh Shiori, 2017, pp. 187-215.  For a documentary about Itoh’s case, see “Japan’s Secret 
Shame” (BBC Two, 60 minutes, 2018), at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0b8cfcj. 
 91. Johnson & Hirayama, 2019. 
 92. Mark D. West, Prosecution review commissions: Japan's answer to the problem of 
prosecutorial discretion, COLUM. L. REV., 92 (1992), 684. 
 93. S. Abe, Former TEPCO Execs Cleared Over Role in 2011 Nuclear Accident, ASAHI 
SHIMBUN ASIA & JAPAN WATCH, Sept. 19, 2019.  
 94. For critiques of the reformed PRCs, see these three newspaper articles: Kyōsei Kiso o 
Kangaeru: Konnan na Risshō Muzai Aitsugu [Thinking about Mandatory Prosecution: Continuous 
acquittals because of difficulties to prove], SANKEI SHIMBUN, May 18, 2019, p. 31; Kyōsei Kiso o 
Kangaeru: Yūzai Tamerau Saibankan [Thinking about Mandatory Prosecution: Judges are 
hesitant to convict], SANKEI SHIMBUN, May 21, 2019, p. 22; and Kyōsei Kiso Seido 10 nen Hikari 
to Kage: Umoreta Jijitsu, Hanmei Keiki [Light and Shadow of one Decade of Mandatory 
Prosecution: Hidden Evidence, An Opportunity to Clarify], TOKYO SHIMBUN, May 21, 2019, p. 3.  
 95. Goodman, 2013.  
 96. Anderson & Nolan, 2004.  
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6. Criminal Sentencing 
 
We have argued that despite the lay judge and Prosecution Review 
Commission reforms, there is much substantive continuity in Japanese 
prosecution.  Now we will show that there is striking continuity in criminal 
sentencing as well. 
After Japan’s lay judge and victim participation reforms, sentence 
severity increased for some offenses, including rape, sexual molestation, and 
assault with injury.  The increased severity for sex offenders has received 
considerable attention,97 but the heightened harshness must be called modest. 
The average sentencing increases can be measured in months, not in the large 
leaps of severity that American sentencing reforms have often generated.98  
For other crimes such as homicide, robbery, arson, and trafficking 
methamphetamines, Japan’s pre-reform and post-reform sentencing patterns 
are so similar that when sentencing averages are plotted over time on the 
same graph, they look almost indistinguishable.99  In lay judge trials, there 
has been a small increase in the use of suspended sentences (shikkō yūyo) 
with supervision, apparently because lay judges are more likely than 
professional judges to believe in the possibility of rehabilitation through state 
supervision.  On the whole, however, there was much more continuity in 
criminal sentencing than change during the first decade of Japan’s lay 
participation reforms.100 
This sentencing continuity is hardly accidental.  Its key proximate cause 
is the same conservatism of Japanese legal professionals that we saw in our 
discussion of charging practices, except here it is the conservatism of judges, 
not prosecutors.  After the lay judge reform took effect in 2009, there was a 
noticeable surge in sentencing harshness for some crimes, as can be seen in 
the frequency of cases in which the actual sentence imposed by a lay judge 
panel (ryōkei) exceeded the sentence requested by prosecutors (kyūkei).  
From 2010 to 2013, there were 48 of these “extra harsh” sentences—an 
average of 12 per year.  But from 2014 to 2017, the number of “extra harsh” 
sentences plummeted to 9 (about 2 per year), a decline of 81 percent.  This 
decline occurred because Japan’s judicial bureaucracy intervened, by taming 
the tendency of ordinary citizens to sock-it-to-some-defendants at sentencing.  
The judicial bureaucracy employed several mechanisms to reign in the 
wayward sentencing impulses of lay judges.  Appellate court decisions 
reduced many of the “extra harsh” sentences and thereby sent messages to 
 
 97. Hirayama, 2012.  
 98. FUJITA MASAHIRO, JAPANESE SOCIETY AND LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
SOCIAL ATTITUDES, TRUST, AND MASS MEDIA (Springer, 2018), pp. 51-64.  
 99. Johnson & Miyazawa, 2019, p. 130. 
 100. Takeda, 2019c.  
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future lay judge panels about what will and will not be tolerated.  The 
judiciary sent memos and organized training courses for front-line judges, to 
stress the importance of sentencing consistency and continuity.  Most 
fundamentally, Japan’s professional judiciary lobbied to establish a lay judge 
trial policy of relying on sentencing norms based on pre-reform practices, 
through a computerized data base known as the “sentence search system” 
(ryōkei kensaku shisutemu), which can be viewed by prosecutors and defense 
lawyers too.101  The main effect of these judicial interventions was to control 
the deviant sentencing desires of ordinary citizens by making them conform 
to judicial expectations.102  And the main arena where this conformity is 
accomplished is the deliberation room (hyōgishitsu), where judges and lay 
judges discuss verdicts and sentences,103 and where judges possess more 
information about cases because they participated in a pretrial process 
(kōhan mae seiri tetsuzuki) where evidence is discussed expansively and 
where the trial schedule is decided.  Social psychological experiments show 
that when lay judges do not participate in the pretrial process, their unequal 
access to case information handicaps them in deliberations with judges.104 
In post-trial surveys and press conferences, the large majority of lay 
judges say they felt able to speak their mind during deliberations, but there 
are enough statements from lay judges who complain about professional 
judges who talked too much, or who steered the panel toward a “preexisting 
conclusion” (ketsuron ariki), or who made lay participants feel more like 
“decorations” (kazarimono) than adjudicators, that it appears one common 
pre-reform prediction is being realized: in the deliberations of a mixed panel 
of professional judges and ordinary citizens, the former tend to dominate the 
latter.105  Former lay judges often use the words “facilitator” (matomeyaku) 
to describe the role judges play in deliberations.  They also say that judges 
brought lay-judges “back on track” (kidō shūsei) after the amateurs went 
“off-track” (dassen).106  Mock trial experiments arrive at similar conclusions, 
for lay judges tend to “obey the previous sentencing trends, rather than 
adhering to their original opinions by resisting the pressure from the graph 
 
 101. Judge Gōda Yoshimitsu (2019, pp. 24-25) has defended this conservative “framework for 
sentencing” (handan wakugumi) as follows: “You often hear the opinion ‘wouldn’t it be better to 
arrive at a more objective conclusion in deliberations by having lay judges state their opinions more 
autonomously, free from the framework for sentencing established by professional judges that is 
often imposed on lay judges?’…  Actually, the framework for sentencing we use is the result of an 
accumulation of countless cases in the era when professional judges made sentencing decisions on 
their own.  If this method and the practical rules of thumb from that time are considered worthless, 
then I think this would amount to nothing other than throwing away a clearly rational framework.”  
 102. Takeda, 2019c.  
 103. Takeda, 2019c.  
 104. Fujita, 2018, pp. 131-171. 
 105. Vanoverbeke, 2015; Shinomiya, 2019. 
 106. Vanoverbeke, 2015, ch.6. 
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[of sentencing precedents] and professional judges.”107   When there are 
differences of opinion between judges and lay judges, a “professional rule of 
thumb” (shokugyōteki keikensoku) tends to prevail over the “common sense” 
(jōshiki) of citizens.108  In short, judges routinely play the role of parent and 
teacher, with lay judges as their children and pupils.109  They behave like 
“overprotective parents” who monitor and control the behavior of their 
children by saying “You should not see this!” and “You should not touch 
that!”110  As a defense lawyer sardonically summarizes, 
 
Japanese judges will, based on their vast knowledge and 
vision, politely explain everything to lay judges in a way the latter 
can easily understand. And lay judges will accept this, by 
participating in the trial knowing that, no matter what, the ‘kind’ 
judges will explain whatever they do not understand.111  
 
The extent to which judges orchestrate lay judge deliberations can also 
be seen in how they schedule trials.  Their aim is to keep lay judge trials as 
“compact” (konpakuto) as possible.  To achieve this end, judges admit a 
limited amount of evidence for the lay judge panels to consider, and they 
schedule every trial session down to the minute, including the timing of each 
break (kyūkei) and the day and hour the verdict will be pronounced.  This 
judicial orchestration reached an extreme on July 15, 2010, when the chief 
judge of Tottori District Court waived a stopwatch at a defense lawyer to 
warn him to stay within his allotted speaking time.  Soon afterwards the 
Tottori Bar Association protested by releasing a “Presidential Statement on 
Showing a Stopwatch in Court” (July 23, 2010).  But judges remain 
determined to script lay judge trials so as to keep the judicial train running 
on time.112  Even potentially capital trials are scripted to maximize efficiency 
and minimize the “burdens” (futan) imposed on lay judges.113  The contrast 
with American-style “super due process” is striking.114 
We do not welcome “professional rules of thumb” and “judicial 
 
 107. Masahiko Saeki & Eiichiro Watamura, The Impact of Previous Sentencing Trends on Lay 
Judges’ Sentencing Decisions, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, Jianhong Liu 
and Setsuo Miyazawa eds., (Springer, 2018), p. 288. 
 108. Shinomiya, 2019, p. 10. 
 109. Takayama, 2019. 
 110. Takano, 2019, p. 24. 
 111. Takano, 2019, p. 25. 
 112. Takano, 2019. 
 113. David T. Johnson, Capital punishment without capital trials in Japan’s lay judge system, 
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 8.52 (2010), pp. 1-38. 
 114. DAVID T. JOHNSON, AMERIKAJIN NO MITA NIHON NO SHIKEI (Iwanami Sinsho, 2019), 
pp. 25-52.  
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orchestration” that schedules the hour a verdict will be announced before the 
trial has even started.  Yet as we saw with the cautious charging policies of 
Japanese prosecutors, there is normative complexity here, too.  On the one 
hand, the commitment of Japan’s judiciary to continuity in sentencing serves 
the value of “consistency” in Japanese criminal justice.115  This conservatism 
can be criticized, for what is the point of empowering citizens to decide 
criminal sentences if their preferences must conform to those of professional 
judges?  On the other hand, when deviations from preexisting sentencing 
norms occur in lay judge trials, appellate courts usually revise them in a 
downward direction—towards leniency, not severity.116  In this way, judicial 
conservatism tends to serve the interests of criminal defendants, much as 
prosecutorial conservatism does with respect to criminal charging.  We end 
our analysis of this limit of lay participation with a question that admits no 
easy answer: should judicial control of sentencing outcomes, the 
marginalization of lay judge voices, and continuity in sentencing substance 
be welcomed by progressives who believe criminal sanctions have immense 
capacity to harm people and little potential for helping them?  
 
7. Death Sentencing 
 
In the decade before lay judge trials started, the number of death 
sentences in Japan surged. The country had 10 or more death sentences per 
year from 2000 to 2007, and in the 2000s (2000-2009) a total of 123 death 
sentences were imposed by Japanese district courts—an average of 12.3 
death sentences per year. In the nine years since then (2010-2018), lay judge 
tribunals have imposed only 36 death sentences, which is an average of 4 
death sentences per year. From the 2000s to the 2010s, the number of death 
sentences declined by two-thirds. See Table 3.  
  
 
 115. David T. Johnson, 2002, pp. 147-178. 
 116. Takeda, 2019c. 
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TABLE 3 Japan’s Death Sentencing Rate before & after the Lay Judge 
Reform of 2009, by Number of Victims Killed 
 
Years  # of Victims  # of DS Requested # of DS Imposed DS 
Percentage 
1980-2009 1  100   32   32% 
1980-2009 2  164   96   59% 
1980-2009 3 or more 82   65   79% 
1980-2009 All  346   193   56% 
2010-2018 1  8   4   50% 
2010-2018 2  32   19   59% 
2010-2018 3 or more 13   13   100% 
2010-2018 All  53   36   68% 
Source: Takeda Masahiro, “Higai Hitori de Shikei 4nin: Higaisha Kanjo o Ishiki”, Kyoto Shimbun, 
March 23, 2019, p.6.  
 
There are two main reasons for this decline in capital outcomes.  First, 
Japan’s homicide rate has fallen in recent years (as explained above, so have 
Japanese crime rates more generally).  As the total number of murders 
declined, so did the number of heinous homicides for which prosecutors 
could reasonably seek a sentence of death.117  Second, in the shadow of a 
new trial system in which outcomes are less predictable and lay judges may 
want to deviate from the judiciary’s long established death sentencing norms, 
prosecutors became more selective about when to seek a sentence of death.118  
From 1980 to 2009, prosecutors sought a death sentence (shikei kyūkei) for 
an average of 11.5 homicide defendants per year.  From 2010 to 2018, the 
 
 117. D. Johnson, 2019, pp. 111-123. 
 118. D. Johnson, 2019, pp. 111-123.  
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comparable figure is just 5.6 defendants per year.  Prosecutors’ increased 
selectivity in seeking a sentence of death is another way in which they have 
become more cautious in their decision-making, so as to maintain control 
over trial outcomes in the new system. 
Before 2009, many analysts expected that the participation of lay judges 
would make Japanese courts less likely to impose the ultimate punishment 
when prosecutors sought a sentence of death.119  Such predictions echoed the 
so-called “Marshall Hypothesis,” which posits that the more you know about 
the death penalty (or in Japan’s case, the more lay judges think about it), the 
less you (or they) will like it.120  But that has not happened.  As Table 3 shows, 
from 1980 to 2009, panels of three professional judges imposed a sentence 
of death in 56 percent of the cases that prosecutors sought the ultimate 
punishment.121  By comparison, in the post-reform period of 2010-2018, lay 
judge panels imposed a sentence of death in 68 percent of the cases that 
prosecutors sought one.  The likelihood of a death sentence being imposed 
when prosecutors seek one has risen most notably in cases in which three or 
more persons are killed.  In the thirty years before the lay judge reform, 79 
percent (65/82) of such cases resulted in a sentence of death, compared with 
100 percent (13/13) in the nine years from 2010 to 2018.122 
These data suggest that changes in Japanese death sentencing have been 
small in the lay judge era. Moreover, when lay judge panels have imposed a 
sentence of death on a defendant who killed “only” one person, as they did 
4 times in the first 9 years of the new trial system, 3 of them were  
reduced on appeal to a life sentence.123  Here again we find evidence of 
Japan’s judicial bureaucracy policing the sentencing decisions of lay judges.  
But there is also complexity, for the lay judge system has made 
prosecutors more cautious about seeking a sentence of death in the first place.  
If judges and prosecutors are marginalizing the role lay that participants play 
in capital sentencing, they are doing so in ways that often benefit criminal 
defendants.  The broadest effect of this double dynamic—prosecutors 
seeking fewer sentences of death, and judges reigning in the populist 
 
 119. Leah Ambler, The People Decide: The Effect of the Introduction of the Quasi-Jury System 
(Saibanin Seido) on the Death Penalty in Japan, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS, Volume 6, Issue 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 1-24, at https://scholarlycommons.law.north 
western.edu/njihr/vol6/iss1/1/.  
 120. Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, HOWARD LAW JOURNAL 52 (2008) 
525. 
 121. In the years immediately preceding the lay judge reform, Japan’s death sentencing rate 
was 66 percent.  That is, District Court panels of three professional judges imposed a sentence of 
death about 2 times out of every 3 that prosecutors sought one.  See YOMIURI SHIMBUN SHAKAIBU, 
SHIKEI (Chūō kōron shinsha, 2013), p. 274. 
 122. Takeda, 2019c. 
 123. Takeda, 2019c. 
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impulses of lay judges—could be to bolster the legitimacy of Japanese 
capital punishment.  Indeed, the key consequence of Japan’s lay judge 
reform could be that in making the death penalty smaller it has “entrenched 
ever deeper what remains” of it.124  We call this a bonsai theory of capital 
punishment.  Its key claim is that a smaller death penalty may be more 
durable if it appeals to the ambivalent sensibilities of a country that has long 
resisted the transnational trend toward abolition.125 
 
8. Victim Participation 
 
Victims were long neglected and ignored in the criminal justice systems 
of many countries.126  In Japan, too, the criminal justice system “provided 
virtually no protection for victims before the turn of the twenty-first 
century.”127  In recent years, however, Japan and other countries have moved 
victims closer to center stage of the criminal process.128  Critics contend that 
a punitive victims’ rights movement has made Japanese criminal justice 
worse, by undermining fairness and due process (a procedural claim), and by 
making sanctions significantly harsher (a substantive claim).129   But the 
results of victim-centered reform are more complicated than these critiques 
claim, and they are also more modest.  As shown by Erik Herber in his 
insightful account of “victim participation” in Japanese criminal justice, the 
available evidence does “not allow for clear conclusions as to how victim 
participation impacts sentencing practices—or fact finding practices, for that 
matter.”130  In this domain of lay participation, we again find evidence of 
substantive continuity. 
To increase the role that victims play in Japanese criminal justice, the 
 
 124. Hugo Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America Today, in 
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS 
FROM BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR CASE, Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul Cassell eds., (Oxford, 2004), 
p. 24.  
 125. David T. Johnson, A Factful Perspective on Capital Punishment, JOURNAL OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICE, Volume 11, Issue 2 (July 2019), pp. 334-345; and David T. Johnson & Franklin 
E. Zimring, The Death Penalty’s Continued Decline, CURRENT HISTORY, Volume 118, No. 811 
(November 2019), pp. 316-321.  
 126. KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
 127. Shigenori Matsui, Justice for the Accused or Justice for Victims? The Protection of 
Victims’ Rights in Japan, ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 13, 1 (2011) 55.  
 128. Matsui, 2011; DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, 
AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (The New Press, 2019). 
 129. Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness and the Rising Populism in 
Japanese Criminal Justice Policy, PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY, Volume 10, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 
47-77; and Maiko Tagusari, Does the Death Penalty Serve Victims?, United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, Death Penalty and the Victims (UN, 2016), pp. 41-48. 
 130. Herber, 2019, p. 126 (emphasis added). 
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country’s Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) has been revised twice: first in 
2000, to enable victims (or their legal representatives) to make Victim 
Statements of Opinion (VSO) regarding their case; and then again in 2008, 
to create a Victim Participation System (VPS) that gives victims various 
rights in some serious criminal cases, including the right to attend the trial, 
the right to express an opinion to prosecutors about how their authority 
should be exercised, the right to question witnesses in court, and the right to 
make a statement about the facts of a case and the application of the law.131  
Note, though, that the law says victims may do these things: the actual nature 
and extent of victim participation depends on the characteristics of a case 
and the judges’ exercise of discretion.132 
Japan’s VSO and VPS reforms have had an impact on criminal sanctions 
in certain cases—typically by making sentences a little harsher, especially 
for sex crimes.133  These reforms have also made some criminal cases more 
emotional (uetto), especially in homicide trials, where tears often flow, and 
where anger and outrage are common. 134   At the same time, victim 
participation has made Japanese criminal justice more “therapeutically 
oriented,” by fostering practices that are meant to improve the “emotional 
and psychological well-being” of crime victims and survivors.135 
Considering how badly victims used to be neglected and manipulated in 
Japanese criminal justice,136 these changes can be called progress.137  But 
efforts to bolster victim participation are also limited and troubling in several 
respects.  For starters, some new practices seem to be “traumatizing” 
victims.138  More fundamentally, most victims of crime never report it to the 
police,139 and when victimization reports do get made, the police do not 
 
 131. MASAHIKO SAEKI, HANZAI HIGAISHA NO SHIHŌ SANKA TO RYŌKEI (Tōkyō Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2016).  
 132. Herber, 2019, p. 106.  According to the Japanese Ministry of Justice White Paper on 
Crime for 2017, “about 30 percent of the trials in which victims participate are lay judge trials” 
(Herber, 2019, p. 122).  Since lay judge trials constitute only about 2 percent of all criminal trials 
in Japan, victim participation is approximately 15 times more likely to occur in lay judge trials than 
in trials before a single professional judge or a panel of three professional judges.  Because of the 
scholarly and journalistic neglect of non-lay judge criminal trials in Japan (discussed above in limit 
1, “A sliver of cases”), we know much more about victim participation in lay judge trials than we 
do in criminal trials presided over only by professional judges. 
 133. MASAHIKO SAEKI, HANZAI HIGAISHA NO SHIHŌ SANKA TO RYŌKEI (Tōkyō Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2016). 
 134. David T. Johnson, Capital punishment without capital trials in Japan’s lay judge system, 
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 8.52 (2010), pp. 1-38. 
 135. Herber, 2019, p. 115. 
 136. D. Johnson, 2002, pp. 201-210. 
 137. MASAHIKO SAEKI, HANZAI HIGAISHA NO SHIHŌ SANKA TO RYŌKEI (Tōkyō Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2016); Matsui, 2011. 
 138. Herber, 2019, pp. 115-121. 
 139. Herber, 2019, p. 106. 
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bother to record some of them.140  Victims of crime are also excluded from 
the pretrial processes where trial schedules are decided and case outcomes 
are shaped.141  Most importantly, the “vast majority of victims choose not to 
participate” in the VPS.142  When victims do participate, their statements 
tend to be well-rehearsed and highly scripted, with prosecutors playing the 
role of director.  Preparatory meetings between victims and prosecutors are 
frequent and intense, with “witness tests” (shōnin tesuto) repeated several 
times before they are enacted at trial.143 
Prosecutors are not the only legal professionals to shape what victims do 
at trial. Judges have influence too, especially by deciding which victims can 
participate and by monitoring and restricting the content of their statements.  
In acts that have been praised by progressives but lamented by police, 
prosecutors, and victims (and by some lay judges as well), judges are even 
requiring photographic evidence of victims’ injuries (and corpses) to be 
softened and blurred (kakō suru) before being shown in court, in order to 
reduce the potential for inflammatory and prejudicial effects on lay judges, and 
in order to protect lay judges from the “emotional and psychological burden” 
(seishin teki futan) of viewing the corporeal consequences of crime.144 
In addition, Japan’s new forms of victim participation are substantively 
“conservative” in the sense that they reinforce traditional patterns in 
Japanese criminal justice.  As surveys show, many Japanese defendants and 
defense lawyers “feel constrained” by the victims’ presence at trial because 
it is difficult to challenge the accuracy of victims’ assertions or the 
authenticity of their feelings without seeming to disrespect them.145  Some 
defense lawyers even say it is difficult to speak in their client’s defense 
because they fear lay judges will think they are “blaming the victim” or that 
the defendant is insufficiently remorseful, thereby increasing the risk of 
conviction and punishment.  In these ways, the victim participation systems 
perpetuate two patterns in Japanese criminal justice: the subordination of the 
defense to the prosecution,146 and reliance on the tropes of “repentance, 
confession, and absolution,” even when such expressions are insincere.147  In 
the end, Japan’s new forms of victim participation “play a role in service of 
 
 140. Herber, 2019, p. 106. 
 141. Herber, 2019, p. 109. 
 142. Herber, 2019, p. 124. 
 143. Herber, 2019, p. 111. 
 144. Takeda, 2019c. 
 145. Herber, 2019, p. 114. 
 146. Setsuo Miyazawa, Introduction: An Unbalanced Adversary System: Issues, Policies, and 
Practices in Japan, in Context and in Comparative Perspective, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS, Malcolm M. Feeley and Setsuo 
Miyazawa, eds., (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1-11. 
 147. D. Johnson, 2002, 179-201. 
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traditional criminal justice goals,”148 by keeping defense lawyers docile,149 
and by pressuring defendants to submit to authority.150 
 
9. No-shows, the Duty of Confidentiality, and the Length of Trials and 
Deliberations 
 
Our penultimate point about the limits of lay participation in Japanese 
criminal justice focuses on a cluster of three criticisms that are frequently 
directed at the lay judge system: (a) the vast majority of Japanese citizens 
refuse to serve as lay judges; (b) those who do serve are bound by an 
“obligation of confidentiality” (shuhi gimu) that severely limits what aspects 
of their trial experience can be disclosed and discussed; and (c) the length of 
lay judge trials and deliberations has increased significantly since the new 
system started in 2009.  In our view, the latter two facts (longer trials and lay 
judge confidentiality) are contributing causes of the no-show problem. 
The most unflattering fact about Japan’s lay judge system is how few 
citizens are willing to serve in it.  Of course, many citizens try to avoid jury 
duty in the United States too,151 where “the flight from jury service is as old 
as the jury system itself,” though it seems to have intensified in recent years 
as jury duty lost some of its “aura of honor.”152  In Japan, however, nearly 
80 percent of lay judge candidates do not accept the call to serve.153  Three-
quarters of this 80 percent are people who get “excused” (jitai) for reasons 
the judiciary regards as legitimate, such as old age, illness, work or school 
commitments, and family responsibilities.  The other one-quarter of no-
shows do not show up in court on the designated day (kesseki).  We call the 
combined effect of these two types of refusal Japan’s “no show” problem. 
 
 148. Herber, 2019, p. 125. 
 149. D. Johnson, 2002, pp. 71-85. 
 150. D. Johnson, 2002, pp. 185-192. 
 151. Mona Chalabi, What Are the Chances of Serving on a Jury?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, June 5, 
2015, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-are-the-chances-of-serving-on-a-jury/.  As Chalabi 
explains, the U.S. National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has estimated that “in a given year, 32 
million people get summoned for service—though only 8 million of them actually report for jury 
duty (there are lots of reasons for that difference, including the 4 million summonses returned by 
the post office marked as undeliverable and the 3 million people who fail to appear).  It’s estimated 
that only 1.5 million people are eventually selected to serve on a jury in a state court each year 
[approximately 1 adult in 150].”  These numbers come from a 2007 survey conducted by the NCSC. 
 152. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 
(Times Books, 1994), p. 52; ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (University 
of Chicago Press, 2009).  
 153. When Japan’s lay judge system started in 2009, the no-show rate was already 61 percent.  
This rate is higher in rural and regional courts than in urban ones, and it is higher for women than 
for men.  Surveys also show that people who want to serve as a lay judge are more likely to serve 
than people who do not want to serve (Takeda, 2019e). 
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See Table 4.154 
 
TABLE 4 Japan’s Lay Judge Selection Process, 2009-2018 
 
Note: This table is adapted from Supreme Court of Japan, 2019, 裁判員裁判の実施
状況について  (制度施⾏~令和元年５⽉末・速報）[Report on the results of the 
implementation of lay judge trials (from implementation to the end of May 2019)], 
retrieved from http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/r1_5_saibaninsokuhou.pdf 
(see also Vanoverbeke and Fukurai, 2019).  
a These cases were either dropped or transferred to different jurisdictions.  
b The number of candidates summoned to appear in court divided by the number of 
in-court appearances.  
c The total number of candidates divided by the number of in-court appearances.  
 
 154. In most writing about jury and lay judge “no-shows” in the United States and Japan, the 
reluctance and refusal of citizens to serve is assumed to be problematic (Adler, 1994; Takayuki Ii, 
Anata mo asu wa saiban’in!? [You will also become a Saiban’in tomorrow!?] (Nihon Hyōronsha, 
2019). But we wonder if no-shows might sometimes be a blessing in disguise.  As an Oahu resident 
Stuart Taba wrote in a letter to the Honolulu Star-Advertiser (August 20, 2019, p. A10), “The 
American method of jury selection—conscription, like the old-school military draft—must be 
replaced by a method that produces willing jurors.  Willing jurors will more likely be effective at 
their assignment than would reluctant jury members.”  We know of no research that tests this 
hypothesis, but if Mr. Taba’s hunch is true, then concerns about Japan’s high “no-show” rate would 


















2009   13,423     9,638     3,185     5,415 83.9 40.3 
2010 126,465   94,220   34,147   48,422 80.6 38.3 
2011 131,880   94,109   37,756   44,150 78.4 33.5 
2012 135,535   97,047   42,443   41,543 76.0 30.6 
2013 135,207   95,541   43,451   38,527 74.0 28.5 
2014 123,059   86,304   40,351   32,833 71.5 26.7 
2015 132,831   92,076   43,806   32,598 67.5 24.5 
2016 127,811   88,326   41,563   30,313 64.8 23.7 
2017 120,187   84,176   41,707   27,152 63.9 22.6 
2018 127,490 87,787   44,907     28,961 67.5 22.7 
TOTAL 1,173,888 829,224 373,316 329,914 75.2 30.4 
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The high and rising no-show rate has many interacting causes.155  First, 
it is easy to escape lay judge duty in Japan, because the judiciary excuses 
almost anyone who asks to be excused, and because absentees without 
excuse are never fined.  This laissez faire approach to lay judge service 
creates a moral hazard, by creating incentives not to serve.  Second, by law, 
the pay for serving as a lay judge is modest (up to 10,000 yen per day), and 
many citizens who serve do not get adequately compensated by their 
employer for the days of work missed.  Some even have to use days of paid 
leave or (if that is not permitted) are pressed to take unpaid leave from 
work.156  Third, changing employment patterns in the Japanese economy 
have resulted in more people working in part-time or irregular jobs for which 
the no-show rate is higher than for people in full-time, regular occupations.  
In Japan, absence from work can damage one’s reputation.  Fourth, 
affordable child care is hard to find in Japan.  This helps explain why the no-
show rate is higher for women than for men. Fifth, in some cases involving 
defendants with connections to organized crime (bōryokudan), lay judges 
were approached by gangsters outside the courtroom.  News about this kind 
of contact may be inhibiting citizens from serving in similar cases.157  Sixth, 
as the lay judge system has matured, media coverage has declined, and so 
has citizen interest in serving.  Some trial events are no longer considered 
newsworthy because they are no longer new.158 
In addition to the foregoing causes, Japan’s high no show-rate is also 
shaped by two forces that are proximate to the new trial system: an 
“obligation of confidentiality” (shuhi gimu) for lay judges, and a significant 
increase in the length of lay judge trials and deliberations (shinri-hyōgi jikan).  
We discuss each in turn. 
Under penalty of fine or imprisonment, lay judges and former lay judges 
must not disclose to outsiders (people who did not serve on their lay judge 
panel) many aspects of their trial and deliberation experiences, including 
how judges and lay judges voted, what they think of the trial outcome, and 
who said what during deliberations.  Many observers believe this rule 
imposes large emotional and psychological “burdens” (futan) on lay judges, 
who are forever forbidden from discussing “potentially traumatizing” 
 
 155. Takeda, 2019e. 
 156. M. TAGUCHI, SAIBAN’IN NO ATAMA NO NAKA: 14 NIN NO HAJIMETE MONOGATARI 
[INSIDE THE HEADS OF THE JURORS: THE UNIQUE STORY OF 14 PEOPLE] (Gendaijinbunsha, 2013), 
p. 48. 
 157. Takeda, 2019e. 
 158. Coverage of the lay judge system by some Japanese media has been largely negative.  For 
example, in 2001 and 2002, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan’s Wall Street Journal) published roughly 
equal numbers of positive and negative articles about the new trial system, but in the subsequent 
decade the number of negative articles exceeded the number of positive articles by more than 3 to 
1 (Fujita, 2018, p. 247). 
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matters that they heard and saw at trial159—not to mention other matters that 
are interesting and important.  The obligation of confidentiality also makes 
it impossible to share some positive impressions and experiences which 
could encourage more citizens to serve as lay judges.  In its most subjective 
form, concern about confidentiality can be expressed as a simple question: 
Why do something that is interesting, important, unusual, and challenging if 
you cannot even talk about it? 
Although many analysts believe the obligation of confidentiality should 
be relaxed or even eliminated,160 the vast majority of citizens who serve as 
lay judges say they want to preserve it.161  In one survey by the Supreme 
Court’s General Secretariat, “nine times more ex-saiban-ins thought the 
confidentiality clause was necessary than those who requested reducing 
it.” 162   Similarly, while the obligation of confidentiality contradicts the 
principles of transparency and accountability that have motivated many of 
Japan’s justice system reforms,163 it is welcomed by professional judges, who 
are protected from public scrutiny and criticism by an expansive policy of 
secrecy that is kept intentionally vague in order to maximize its 
conversation-discouraging effects. 
It is sometimes said that Japan’s high no-show rate undermines the 
legitimacy of lay judge trials.  On this view, the lay judge system might not 
be sustainable if many citizens continue refusing to serve.164  The official 
position of Japan’s judiciary is that the no-show rate is a concern, but it is 
“not high enough to affect the operation of the lay judge system.”165  More 
generally, Japan’s judiciary states that “the [lay judge] system has been 
 
 159. Mark Levin & Virginia Tice, Japan’s New Citizen Judges: How Secrecy Imperils Judicial 
Reform, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 19 (2009) 6-09. 
 160. Ii, 2019. 
 161. Among the minority of former lay judges who feel burdened by the obligation of 
confidentiality, some have likened their own situation to that of the “hidden Christians” (kakure 
kirusuchan) who were tortured and killed by the bakufu government in the Tokugawa era (Takeda, 
2019e).  Apparently the facile conflation of “micro-aggressions” and serious acts of violence is not 
confined to the United States (Scott O. Lilienfeld, Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate 
Evidence, PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, Volume 12, Issue 1 (January 2017), pp. 
138-169). 
 162. Yanase, 2016, p. 345.  This is similar to the situation in Belgium, where a penalty could 
be imposed on former jurors who do not keep the appropriate secrets (though the sanction has never 
been used).  In the Belgian context, the penalty is considered a tool to protect jurors from excessive 
media attention and from pressure to reveal names and the personal opinions of other jurors (Dimitri 
Vanoverbeke, Berugi kara Mita Saibanin Seido, in Ii, 2019, pp. 177-182). 
 163. Frank K. Upham, Japanese Legal Reform in Institutional, Ideological, and Comparative 
Perspective, HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW, 36 (2013) 567. 
 164. Ii, 2019. 
 165. JAPAN TIMES, May 16, 2019, at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/16/national/ 
crime-legal/japanese-supreme-court-chief-justice-says-lay-judge-system-well-received-improvem 
ents-needed-spur-public-interest/#.XbvDkK97mM8. 
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accepted positively by the public,”166 a claim which research supports.167 
Claims about “legitimacy” are difficult to prove or disprove.168  But if 
lay judge participation rates reach a point of crisis, there is a ready solution: 
Japan could (as permitted by law) start convening lay judge trials with a 
panel of 1 professional judge and 4 lay judges (instead of 3 and 6, 
respectively).  This would reduce the number of citizen-participants by one-
third.  But in the first 10 years of the new system (more than 12,000 lay judge 
trials), the more compact tribunal was never used even though guilt was 
uncontested in about half of all cases.169  The non-use of small panels is all 
the more striking when one considers how much anxiety Japanese journalists 
and judges express about the heavy “burdens” (futan) purportedly imposed 
on lay judges, and how much energy the judiciary spends trying to streamline 
lay judge trials.170 
The main reason for avoiding smaller lay judge panels is the judiciary’s 
concern that a judge’s capacity to control the course of deliberations would 
be significantly curtailed if he or she does not have professional allies on the 
bench.171  Research shows that smaller groups deliberate more actively than 
larger groups do. Smaller groups also reduce the power of factions—which 
the lone judge could easily be (or be a part of) on a smaller panel.172  Since 
the risk of a professional judge failing to stay “on top” of the lay judges is 
perceived to be higher with a ratio of 1 professional to 4 amateurs instead of 
1 to 2, a simple solution to the “no-show” problem is being rejected because 
it does not serve the interests of professional judges and because it increases 
the risk of damage to their professional reputations.  In this respect, Japanese 
judges are like their professional counterparts in the police and the procuracy, 
for they have been able to limit the scope of criminal justice reform to issues 
they consider safe.  This “second face of power”173 has long been evident in 
the status-quo preserving ways that legal professionals have responded to lay 
participation reforms in Japan’s legal system.174  
What about the third point in this problematic triangle—the lengthening 
of lay judge trials and deliberations?  The increased complexity suppresses 
 
 166. Lay Judge System Needs Tweaking, Chief Justice Says, JAPAN TIMES, May 17, 2019, p. 2. 
 167. Fujita, 2018, p. 275. 
 168. C. VAN HAM, J. THOMASSEN, K. AARTS & R. ANDEWEG, EDS., MYTH AND REALITY OF 
THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS: EXPLAINING TRENDS AND CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
 169. Van Ham, J. Thomassen, K. Aarts & R. Andeweg, 2017. 
 170. Takayama, 2019. 
 171. Takano, 2019. 
 172. As Kage (2017, p. 115) summarizes in her discussion of system design, “A smaller 
number of lay judges, then, might actually enhance the power of lay judges vis-à-vis professional 
judges” (emphasis in original). 
 173. Bachrach & Baratz. 
 174. Anderson & Nolan, 2004. 
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the lay judge service rate by imposing a larger burden on the citizens who 
serve.  In economic terms, longer trials and deliberations raise the “price” of 
participation.  In 2009, the average lay judge trial took 3.7 days, and the 
average lay judge deliberation was 6.6 hours.  As Table 5 shows, by 2018, 
the comparable durations were 10.8 days and 12.9 hours—a near tripling and 
a near doubling, respectively.175  Over the same period of time, there was a 
marked decline in the average amount of material evidence (including 
dossiers, or chōsho) investigated at trial, and there was a doubling (from 1.5 
to 3.0) in the average number of witnesses questioned at trial.176  Similarly, 
the percentage of former lay judges who said that trial proceedings, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers were “easy to understand” 
(wakariyasukatta) declined markedly.177  In sum, lay judge trials have become 
more complicated, time-consuming, and difficult to comprehend.  In a 
culture that treats lay judges as “guests” and “clients” whose “satisfaction” 
must be maximized and “burdens” minimized,178 these issues are the subject 
of much media coverage.179 
  
 
 175. Takeda, 2019d. The trial duration and deliberation duration increases occur in both lay 
judge trials in which the defendant confesses (jihaku jiken) and in lay judge trials in which the 
defendant does not confess (hinin jiken), but the latter increase is especially sharp, with the average 
length of a “denial trial” tripling from 4.7 days in 2009 to 14.0 days in 2018.  The percentage of all 
lay judge trials that are denial trials has increased sharply as well, from roughly 20 percent in 2009, 
to more than 40 percent in 2011, to more than 50 percent in 2017 and 2018 (D. Vanoverbeke and 
H. Fukurai, Lay Participation in the Criminal Trials of Japan: A Decade of Activity and its Socio-
Political Consequences, in JURIES, LAY JUDGES, AND MIXED COURTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 
S. Kuntjak Ivkovic, V. Hans, S. Diamond & N. Marder, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming 2020). 
 176. Some Japanese defense attorneys call this “a shift from paper to people” (authors’ 
interviews, May 2019). 
 177. Although there has been a decline in the percentage of lay judges who say that trials, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys are “easy to understand,” lay judges continue to report, as they 
have since the new system’s inception, that prosecutors are (by a wide margin) easier to understand 
than defense attorneys (Herber, 2019). 
 178. Takayama, 2019, p. 34. 
 179. Herber, 2019, p. 182. 
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TABLE 5 Duration of Lay Judge Deliberations in Hours, 2009-2018 
 
YEAR AGGREGATE  CONFESSION DENIAL 
2009   6.6 6.2   7.9 
2010   8.4 7.3 10.3 
2011   9.4 7.8 11.6 
2012 10.3 7.9 13.1 
2013 10.5 8.3 12.9 
2014 11.2 8.8 13.9 
2015 11.9 9.0 15.2 
2016 12.1 9.3 15.2 
2017 12.6 9.6 15.2 
2018 12.9 9.7 15.9 
 
Note: adapted from Supreme Court of Japan, “Report on the State of Implementation 
of Lay Judge Trials (from the implementation of the system until the end of May 
2019).  
 
But does it matter that lay judge trials are getting longer and more 
complicated?  On the one hand, this change might be welcomed in light of 
the tendency (described above) of prosecutors and judges to script trials in 
ways that marginalize the influence of lay participants.  On the other hand, 
the complexification of lay judge trials could be cause for concern if it 
creates incentives for legal professionals to avoid this type of trial.  Beyond 
some point, trial complexity could even create momentum to expand the 
practice of plea bargaining, which Japan legalized for the first time in 
2018.180  The present system of plea bargaining allows suspects and defendants 
to negotiate deals with prosecutors in exchange for information on other 
offenders.181  Although the scope of Japan’s current plea bargaining law is 
narrow, it has been criticized for creating incentives for suspects and 
defendants to make false and self-serving statements that could lead to 
 
 180. See JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/31/natio 
nal/crime-legal/japanese-style-plea-bargaining-debuts-authorities-fear-spread-false-testimony/#. 
XbyO9697mM8. 
 181. S. Murakami, Japanese-style plea bargaining debuts but authorities fear spread of false 
testimony, JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2018. 
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wrongful convictions.  In the long run, the larger concern is that if lay judge 
trials become too long and complicated, the system’s professional 
incumbents could try to make it prohibitively costly for defendants to 
exercise their right to a lay judge trial, by imposing large “trial taxes” on 
them, as routinely happens in the United States.182  It would be ironic if a lay 
participation reform that was intended to improve the quality of criminal 
trials and the level of public trust in Japanese criminal justice ends up 
resembling an American system of “justice without trial” that relies on 
giving defendants an “offer that cannot be refused.”183  Moreover, if lay 
judge trials continue to become more complicated, Japanese prosecutors 
could become even more cautious about charging cases for trial in this forum, 
thereby “hollowing out” a system that many reformers regard as the most 
promising and progressive change in Japanese criminal justice in more than 
half a century.184 
 
10. Seeing the Forest 
 
Around the time of the 10th anniversary of the lay judge reform, the 
Chief Justice of Japan’s Supreme Court (Otani Naoto) said that the new trial 
system “needs tweaking” to stimulate greater public interest and to ease the 
“burdens” on lay judges and thereby reduce the number of no-shows, but he 
also stressed that, all in all, the new trial system “has been accepted 
positively by the public” and by lay judges in particular.185  Survey evidence 
supports his claims.  On the whole, “Japanese people are positive” about the 
lay judge system,186 and a survey of 100 former lay judges found that more 
than 90 percent support the new system and want to see it maintained.187  
Similarly, a Kyodo News survey of 342 former lay judges found that 98 
percent had a favorable experience as a lay judge, with 92 percent saying 
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“citizen sensibilities” were well reflected in judicial opinions.188  More broadly, 
evidence compiled by Japan’s judiciary shows that the vast majority of lay 
judges say they had a good experience.189  According to a survey of 5392 
citizens who served, 96 percent said their experience was either 
“extraordinarily good” (62 percent) or “good” (34 percent), even though 
before their experience as a lay judge started, half did not want to 
participate.190  This before-after gap in lay judge positivity parallels a similar 
before-after disparity among citizens who serve on Prosecution Review 
Commissions.  One survey of former PRC members found that 70 percent 
said that at the time they were selected to serve they “did not really want to 
do it” (amari kinori shinakatta), but by the time their six-month period of 
service had ended, 96 percent said “it was a good experience” (yoi keiken 
datta).191  The evidence from former lay judge and PRC participants suggests 
that relaxing the rules of confidentiality that currently restrict them could 
encourage greater participation in both systems. 
Despite high levels of anxiety in Japanese media and society about the 
physical and psychological burdens that lay judges purportedly feel, the 
Kyodo News survey found that only 3 percent of former lay judges said their 
experience was “very stressful,” while another 31 percent said it was 
“somewhat stressful.”192  In our view, the stress of being a lay judge receives 
so much attention in Japanese media and society that the secondary aim of 
reducing the “burden” of serving threatens to displace the primary aims of 
criminal adjudication, such as fairness, justice, and accuracy. 193  More 
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fundamentally, stress is inevitable in many human activities.  As Marcus 
Aurelius observed, “for a human being to feel stress is normal—if he’s living 
a normal human life.”194 
Judges had the most to lose because of Japan’s lay judge reform, for 
when amateurs participate in criminal adjudication, professionals lose 
some control over guilt and sentencing decisions.195  In this context, the 
high levels of judicial support for the new trial system are striking.  In an 
article published on the 10th anniversary of the lay judge reform, Japan’s 
largest newspaper reported that all 50 chief judges in the nation’s District 
Courts believe that, overall, “the lay judge system has had a good influence” 
on Japanese law and society.196  In their view, the reform made trials easier 
to understand (47/50 judges), decisions (hanketsu) more persuasive (43/50 
judges), and trials shorter (37/50 judges).  What is more, 48 of the 50 chief 
judges said the lay judge system has been a net “plus” for them as 
individuals, because it caused them to think more deeply about law, helped 
improve their communication skills, and made them more conscious of 
public opinion.  A Sankei newspaper interview of 20 other judges revealed 
similarly positive views.197 
In some respects it is good that judges support the lay judge reform, for 
judicial resistance could have undermined the reform—a phenomenon 
frequently seen in the United States.198  On the other hand, the extremely 
high levels of judicial support for Japan’s lay judge system suggest that this 
reform is doing little to make judges uncomfortable.  If the point of reform 
is to produce meaningful change in Japanese criminal justice, is that a good 
thing?199  Similarly, the high level of support among former lay judges seems 
better than deep dissatisfaction, but if it is also a sign that judges are 
 
lay judges, but in official reviews of the lay judge reform, this change was not recommended.  See 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/08/national/crime-legal/japanese-citizen-judge-sues-
government-for-mental-suffering/#.XVA2xkd7mM8. 
 194. MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS (The Modern Library, 2003), p. 76.  To clarify, we 
do not claim that lay judge trials are seldom stressful for the citizens who serve.  Moreover, Article 
51 of the Lay Judge Law stipulates that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys should try to 
conduct trials in ways that do not impose an “excessive burden” (futan ga kajū na mono) on lay 
judges.  Our concern is that, in practice, “excessive burden” is too often taken to mean “any burden 
at all.”  As defense attorney Takashi Takano (2019, p. 29) has argued, if politicians were as 
concerned with “stress” as professional judges are, so that they went to great lengths avoid 
“burdening” the electorate with excessive information, it would be tantamount to “corrupt and 
dangerous government.” 
 195. Kage, 2017, pp. 10-15. 
 196. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Saibanin Seido 10nen: Saibanchō 50nin Ankēto: Shimin Kankaku 
Shinri Shinpū, May 21, 2019, pp. 1, 13. 
 197. SANKEI SHIMBUN, Keikensha Fuereba, Shakai ga Yoku Naru, May 19, 2019, p. 24. 
 198. Feeley, 1983, Feeley, 2017, and Feeley, 2018. 
 199. Takano, 2019. 
6 - Johnson 7/29/2020  10:19 AM 
Summer 2020] Limits of Lay Participation Reform 481 
successfully satisfying their “clients,” 200  hosting their “guests,” 201  and 
parenting their “children,”202 the net effect could be to render lay judges 
passive in the criminal process, thereby marginalizing their influence as well.  
And let us not miss the forest for the trees.  Our essay has focused on the 
limits of lay participation by focusing mainly on its effects in the criminal 
justice system.  But of course, judging these reforms solely in terms of their 
effects on criminal justice makes no more sense than evaluating a wedding 
or a funeral in terms of its accuracy.203  As Tocqueville and others have 
observed, trials pursue broad and intangible goals, including civic education 
and democratization.204  These effects are hard to measure, but the possibility 
of positive change in Japan’s society and polity needs to be considered, 
especially considering the claims made by some analysts. 
As we have seen, survey responses from citizens who served as lay 
judges “overwhelmingly indicate that they found the experience rewarding, 
empowering, and educational.”205  Based on this evidence, some observers 
believe Japan’s new trial system is serving as a “school for democracy.”206  
Similarly, research on “lay judge lounges” (saibanin raunji) concludes that 
“it is not over when it’s over” because lay judges continue to meet, think, 
and talk about their experiences long after their service has ended.207  Other 
analysts regard Japan’s lay judge reform as “monumental” because of its 
“indirect” and “educational” effects on Japanese society.208  On this view, 
the lay judge system is “the greatest achievement” of justice system  
reform in Japan, 209  and lay participation should be extended into other  
realms of Japanese law.210  These optimistic interpretations presume that lay 
participation fosters the civic consciousness of citizens about state affairs 
and provides citizens with an unprecedented platform for monitoring state 
action and holding state actors accountable.211 
We are skeptical.  For one thing, there is no solid or systematic evidence 
that lay participation is reshaping Japanese society and democracy.  For 
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another, the high no-show rate for citizens who are asked to serve as  
lay judges hardly reflects an enthusiastic societal endorsement of  
citizen involvement in government.212 There is also the matter of scale and 
plausibility.  A little yeast can have a large effect, but if lay judge service in 
Japan is “resulting in a greater sense of civic engagement by those who have 
experienced it, the numbers”—about 12,000 persons serve as lay judges each 
year, or less than 1 Japanese adult in 8,500—“remain so small it is likely  
to take many years before the impact will become visible”—if it  
becomes visible at all.213  By comparison, approximately 1.5 million people 
are selected each year to serve on a jury in an American state court, which is 
about 1 American adult in 150.214  Per capita, therefore, jury service in the 
United States appears to be at least 50 times more common than lay judge 
service in Japan (8,500/150 = 56.7), even though jury trials are “vanishing” 
and perhaps even “dying” in the U.S.215  There is some evidence that in 
America “jury deliberation promotes civic engagement and political 
participation,” but the effects are small and, for the most part, are limited to 
people who were not civically engaged or politically active before serving as 
jurors.216  The main finding from the best American research is that jury 
service generates a 4 percent to 7 percent increase in average voter turnout 
for jurors who previously had “a relatively spotty voting record.”217  And the 
effect of criminal jury participation on voting “does not hold for those voters 
who are already active.”218 
The small size and narrow scope of the jury service effect in the United 
States is hardly a solid basis for making bold pronouncements about the 
democratizing effects of lay judge service in Japan.  In our view, Japan’s lay 
judge service rate is so low that a more realistic prediction would be little 
effect of lay judge service on voting behavior (and on other civic activities) 
because the 20 percent of citizens who are asked to serve and actually do are 
probably already active in civic affairs.  We join the call for researchers to 
collect data on the relationships between lay participation and civic 
engagement in Japan.219  But until we see evidence to the contrary, we will 
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Conclusion 
 
Many of the limits of criminal justice reform in Japan can be seen in 
other countries. In these respects, Japan seems to be an ordinary country and 
a fairly typical case.220  And compared to criminal justice reform in the 
United States, Japan’s attempts to implement lay participation can be called 
a qualified success, for they have led to real change in many criminal justice 
procedures, and they have not made many things worse.  In Japan this “glass 
half full” perspective is so common among legal professionals and scholars 
of law and society that we consider it the Orthodox View.  Yet in evaluating 
Japan’s lay participation reforms, using the U.S. as the main point of 
comparison seems to be setting the bar rather low.221  And when it comes to 
the substance of Japanese reform, there is striking continuity in both who 
wields control in the criminal process and in who gets what from it.  This 
view might be called “the glass half-empty,” except we believe this label is 
too cheerful too, as the previous pages have explained. I n many important 
respects—prosecution, sentencing, capital punishment, victims, and so on—
changes on the surface of Japanese criminal justice have affected reality on 
a deeper level by cementing the status quo.  We originally planned to call 
this article “Two Cheers for Criminal Justice Reform in Japan,” but after 
analyzing the evidence we changed the title because we could muster only 
enough enthusiasm for a single, highly qualified cheer. 
The limits of reform in Japanese criminal justice should not be surprising.  
After all, the main aim of the lay judge reform was not to transform the 
distribution of power in Japanese criminal justice or to radically reshape 
Japan’s criminal justice outcomes.  Moreover, references to democracy and 
popular sovereignty do not even appear in the Lay Judge Law.  As stated in 
Article 1 of that Law, the primary purpose of the lay judge reform is to 
promote public understanding of the judicial system and thereby raise 
confidence in it.  As one scholar put it, the lay judge system “was established 
to enhance the power and authority of the judiciary,” not to democratize it.222  
In the context of these conservative ambitions and the almost perennial 
control of national government by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, 
the limits of Japan’s lay participation reforms may have been all but 
inevitable.  For Japanese progressives the main message of criminal justice 
reform might be that nothing fails like success. 
Understanding the present also requires remembering the past.  Lay 
participation reforms have been marginalized several times in Japanese 
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history, mostly by legal professionals who found their powers threatened  
by greater citizen involvement.223  This legacy is prominent not only with 
respect to lay judges, victims, and prosecution review commissioners.  It is 
evident in other reforms that were meant to enhance the role of  
“outsiders” in Japanese criminal justice,224 including the Penal Institution 
Visiting Committees (keiji shisetsu shisatsu iinkai) that began operating in 
Japanese prisons and jails in 2007.  Prison inmates in Japan are sometimes 
now able to read and write uncensored letters, and they can be interviewed 
by PIVC members without prison or jail staff present.  These are welcome 
changes, but the main effect of this reform has been to strengthen support for 
traditional penal practices—to make them more legitimate by making them 
seem more democratic.225  Ultimately, Penal Institution Visiting Committees 
represent reform in the service of conservative interests.  This is also a theme 
of the story we have just told.  
This article has several implications for future research on criminal 
justice reform in Japan, the first three of which are important but prosaic: 
study the law in action, not just the law on the books; do not conflate process 
and substance, for change in the former might be little more than incidental 
music; and be skeptical of strong claims about large positive effects, because 
criminal justice reform is hard.  Future studies should also try to explain how 
the cultural and structural contexts of Japanese criminal justice constrain 
citizen influence and reform outcomes.  And most importantly, future 
research on criminal justice reform in Japan should pay more attention to the 
crucial roles played by police in “making crime” through their 
investigations226 and by prosecutors in shaping “the Japanese way of justice” 
through their charge decisions.227  Describing criminal trials in Japan with 
little regard for the discretionary decisions that police and prosecutors make 
in the pre-trial process makes no more sense than explaining the triple 
disaster of March 11, 2011 without regard for the “site fights” that occurred 
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around the issue of where to locate nuclear reactors228 or for the regulatory 
failures that preceded and enabled the nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima.229  
If information is the currency of democracy, then Japanese citizens (and law 
and society scholars) lack a key to the treasury of truths concerning these 
important but neglected law enforcement officials.230 
Finally, we have argued that the past is not dead in Japanese criminal 
justice, and that it is not even past (recall William Faulkner).  For a country 
that has been ruled by a conservative political party almost continuously 
since it was founded in 1955, perhaps this is a conclusion Japan-watchers 





 228. Daniel P. Aldrich, The crucial role of civil society in disaster recovery and Japan’s 
preparedness for emergencies, JAPAN AKTUELL, 3 (2008), pp. 81-96. 
 229. Jeff Kingston, Japan's Nuclear Village, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, Volume 10, Issue 37, 
No. 1 (2012), https://apjjf.org/2012/10/37/Jeff-Kingston/3822/article.html. 
 230. On Japanese police, see David T. Johnson, Policing in Japan, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK 
OF MODERN JAPANESE STUDIES, James D. Babb ed. (Sage, 2015), pp. 222-243.  And on Japanese 
prosecutors, see David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, in PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Michael Tonry ed. (Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 
University of Chicago Press, Volume 41, 2012), pp. 35-74. 
